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ABSTRACT
The Ethics of the AIDS-Afflicted Physician. 
The death of voluntary compliance!
by
William R. Kemey
Dr. Craig Walton, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Philosophy 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This argument will examine the ethical issues, policies, and controversy 
surrounding the AIDS afflicted health care worker, especially the HIV positive 
Physician / Surgeon. The discussion encompasses evaluation of rights of the 
individual, natural and otherwise, with focus on the rights of confidentiality, 
privacy, and disability rights and related laws that pertain to afflicted individuals. 
The discussion will examine the ethical responsibilities of the HIV positive 
health care worker within the medical practice, along with issues of the patient 
rights of informed consent, institutional responsibility, and the policy positions of 
professional associations representing afflicted individuals. Protective 
legislation for victims of communicable disease will be balanced against the 
issues of public health with focus on the legislative beginnings of these 
protective laws, and protections offered by the various laws, common and 
otherwise. Policy recommendations for the treatment of these Individuals and 
those that are affected by their actions will be offered.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The issues of AIDS and HIV infection are on the mind of the nation. Caring
for infected individuals involves the problems of how to mitigate risk and screen
patients for the protection of the caregiver. The problem of HIV infected
healthcare workers, specifically HIV infected surgeons, involves risk to the very
individuals these caregivers are sworn to help. Yet, mitigation of these risks
must also take place, and that means a call for change from current policy
positions. This thesis will offer a solution to current policy problems and will
base the argument for change on moral positions that are not influenced by the
current practice of statistical determination of risk. A change from the status quo
is often a painful and fearful process. When examining issues that appear, on
the surface, to be of concem to all players, many problems arise to cloud the
already murky water. Among these problems are the balance o f individual
versus community rights, discrimination, justice and faimess, and issues of law;
each of which poses a roadblock on the way to change. An argument in favor of
change must temper individual concerns against a larger community of need. A
full fledged stand in favor of genereü utility would trounce the value of the
individual. Yet by contrast, to allow a select group of individuals to dictate
societal behavior ignores the value of the common good sought by those in a
1
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particular community. To stand firmly on either side of this issue denies a sense 
of responsibility to those on the other side. While this may sound as political as 
standard fence sitting, the real answer is not to sit on the fence, but to tear it 
down in favor of a better, more just and equitable solution for all.
The argument o f this thesis is a concise and determined effort to remove the 
fence of discrimination against infected individuals and to build a base of 
responsibility and positive action based on individual and community needs 
and concerns. The AIDS and HIV issue is real and a passionate subject for the 
public at large. It has been the subject of much debate in the classrooms, the 
courtrooms, the boardrooms, and the bedrooms of the nation. The subject for 
this argument will be the individual afflicted with the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus or HIV, who is also a surgeon, a health care professional who is exposed 
to and potentially exposing others to the HIV infection. ’ Current policy 
regarding these individuals, that they “should refrain from performing exposure 
prone procedures”, and the ‘voluntary compliance’ expected of this policy lacks 
the necessary strength to obligate individual acquiescence.
The AIDS epidemic is a powerful topic that has engendered an environment 
of fear and distrust of our fellow citizens. Fear is a powerful affliction. "From the 
earliest reports of a serious new illness spread through an infectious agent, a 
secondary epidemic of fear has accompanied the epidemic of illness and death, 
generating a wave of discrimination against those identified with the disease” 
(Burris, et. al. 1993, 297).* This pattem is well known throughout history. From 
the black death in Europe, typhoid fever in American cities, to the Acquired
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Immune Deficiency Syndrome of contemporary society, fear has plagued 
society's treatment of afflicted individuals. Uniquely, the issue of contemporary 
societies dealings with the AIDS-afflicted individual "has not focused narrowly 
on those diagnosed with AIDS, but has reached out to touch asymptomatic 
people infected with HIV and even un-infected people suspected of being 
infected because of their membership in so-called high risk groups or their 
association with people who have AIDS" (Burris et. al. 1997, 297). Such 
discrimination begs the question of individual rights and argues for protection 
and defense.
In Chapter Two we will examine the issues of rights. The language of ‘rights’ 
has been embroiled in a bitter war of verbiage and assertions on each side of 
the issues. No matter which side of the fence on which one stands, each has a 
habit of trying to overpower the others with strong language about “their” rights 
and how the other person should be respectful of what is due to us. “The 
language of rights is the language of no compromise. The winner takes all and 
the loser has to get out of town. The conversation is over” (Glendon 1991, 9). '  
This has not been overlooked by the modem scholar or legislator. The issue of 
rights is very prominent within the social framework of modem society and is 
currently debated on several levels; here, individual rights and the rights of 
society are two conflicting areas of discussion. Each offers different domains of 
concem and although these areas are of importance, it seems that no matter 
which area of rights is discussed, there is a need to balance any assertion of 
rights by an individual or group with that of the other individuals or groups that
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may be affected, in other words, an assertion of rights cannot be valid unless 
there is a determination of justice for those required to respect those rights.
Rights discussions are often complex and often delve into a realm of the 
obscure and controversial, such as the notion of "natural rights”. A discussion of 
natural rights is one that has had perplexing consequences for much of our 
societal and political thinking for many years. Some would argue that the 
distinct concept of "human” or "fundamental” rights is unique and identifiable. 
Yet, some would state that these are merely notions of convenience without 
which the human creature could not survive. Still others would argue that the 
‘natural rights’ are derived from the state o f nature (or our human nature or our 
natural condition) and are those with which mankind is endowed regardless of 
an individual’s place in the world. Others still would argue that these rights are 
divinely bestowed by their God. A dissenting opinion on the whole subject 
holds that the entire argument, irrespective of one’s position, is merely a 
semantic trap serving no useful purpose, that there are no rights but only 
politically conflicting claims.
Chapter Three will attempt to examine many of the existing laws and 
protective legislation that has been drafted. We will examine the current 
protection that has been offered to individuals with HIV and the strong treatment 
of individuals that have been deemed a possible direct threat to others.
Chapter Four will examine the framing of these laws, what legal basis has been 
used in their formulation, and how some individuals are favored under these 
protective guidelines.
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in many instances the issues and responses by both individuals and groups 
are grounded in philosophical chest thumping, which fails to offer reasonable 
solutions or position stances relative to their individual or group doctrine. If no 
solution or policy is offered, then the situation becomes disconnected and leaps 
into the arena of individuals and groups seeking to define what they are and the 
roles they are to play. If a group or individual only redefines the problem and 
offers no real solution, then the old adage, “if you are not part of the solution, 
then you are part of the problem”, should be invoked. Clear policy must be 
proposed in any argument for or against current practices. Many players in this 
dilemma will seek only to acquire a protective stance for themselves or their 
members. But this, again, is only a form of posturing and is defensive at the 
best. Sometimes it appears that professional associations may be the most 
adept players in this posturing methodology. Chapter Five will offer what is 
believed to be a reasonable solution to the policy dilemma. As current policy 
falls drastically short in achieving its goals, that of protecting all parties involved- 
the policy proposed herein will attempt to give clear guidelines for 
implementation and alternatives to current operational deficiencies. I will also 
attempt to give fair representation to oppositions to the proposed policy and 
address expected objections in a straightforward manner.
An extended, broad based deliberation on the value of public protection 
policy focused on AIDS and HIV Is beyond the scope of this thesis. * This 
present argument shall focus on a single segment of the potential afflicted 
population, that of HIV positive physicians, specifically HIV positive surgeons.
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and their extended risk to the general population via exposure-prone surgical 
procedures performed in the operating room theater.
This argument has many sides; The afflicted surgeons will claim that their 
positive status is not statistically relevant in the area of significant risk. They will 
also claim disability status under long-standing, and more current laws, and 
protection under the veil of privacy extended to all “medical patients” atxsut their 
personal medical history. Patients will take them to task on the issues of 
autonomy and choice, as well as identifiable and significant risk. Patients are 
now questioning the HIV status of the provider and the resultant scream of 
disability rights from the infected individual providers is deafening. One side 
bellows “patient rights” in the realm of informed consent and protection from 
harm, and the other shrieks “privacy protection” of confidential information and 
the rights of disabled individuals. Neither gives any whisper of responsibility to 
the other or to their concems. Patients feel the surgeons’ position is a violation 
of the public's belief, justified or not. that, in all instances, the physician must 
place the patient's welfare above his own. Both will rely on the epidemiology of 
disease transmission for the support of their individual positions. Each will also 
offer policy positions that are categorically unacceptable to the other. Here the 
problem arises. Each side is entirely correct in its assertions. If both sides are 
correct then the issues that are being argued must be removed from the 
bargaining table and a search for common ground must be initiated. Here is 
the reason for undertaking to propose an ethical policy position which will 
attempt to appease the anger on both sides.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
What issues may be able to effectively solve the dilemma? The policy 
position to be offered here is ethically based and will dismiss much of the 
scientific statistical argument, as outlined in Chapter Three, as not relevant to 
the discussion because it supports both sides of diametrically opposed 
positions. The policy will also offer a reasonable approach to a solution that 
involves all players in the discussion and may lead to a gradual rebuilding of 
public trust and confidence in a health care system fraught with chaos and 
infighting. It should be viewed as the ultimate compromise seeking to bring the 
sides together and offer each a solution to their own concems that is at least 
palatable to the other. We do not claim that this is the only solution, but that it is 
one that will try to consider the positions of each side and look for common 
ground. We also do not claim to be able to please all of the players. Some 
individuals will undoubtedly be offended, affected, and harmed. This is 
because some individuals' rights, justified or not, may be ignored in favor of the 
greater “community of need". The issues of public health that surround this 
pandemic problem must not be ignored because of any one group of 
individuals, even professionals. The issues of “community” will be the 
grounding for the philosophical support for the policy offered. Any ethical 
determination must stand on the basis of the “broad community of need" rather 
than solely on individuals and groups. Chapter Six will show that the 
communitarian stand is rational and objective in its approach to the problems 
we have outlined. When addressing a pandemic problem, as the issue of HIV 
and HIV infection have been determined to be, aggressive and decisive policy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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must be enacted to offer the public the protection and confidence in the health 
care system that so succinctly defines pandemia. Anything short of aggressive 
policy appears weak and ineffective in addressing the concems of the 
community as a whole.
Chapter Seven will offer a supporting ethical stand based on the surgeon's 
ability to seek and achieve well-being under the current approach to the 
problem and the current "should refrain from the performance of ‘invasive 
procedures'” edict. The chapter will also examine the concept of justice as it 
relates to the patient /  surgeon relationship and how the existing policy offers an 
injustice to the patient.
The conclusion will attempt to pull the entire argument together for a final 
examination.
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Chapter Notes
1. The terms ‘AIDS afflicted’, ‘HIV infected’, and the like, will be used 
generically throughout this work to refer to individuals that test positive for the 
virus that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
2. Scott Burris and others, AIDS Law Today: A New Guide for the Public, 
(New Haven; Yale University Press, 1993), 297.
3. Mary Ann Glendon. Rights Talk, The Impoverishment o f Political 
Discourse, (New York; The Free Press, 1991).
4. see; for example; Amatai Etzioni, ed.. The Essential Communitarian 
Reader, (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), xxv, 131; Amatai Etzioni, Rights 
and the Common Good, The Communitarian Perspective, (New York, St.
Martins Press, 1995) 20, 75.
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CHAPTER 2 
RIGHTS
Individual rights and responsibility seem to go hand-in-hand, but no matter 
where one goes today, he or she hears claims and assertions of rights but 
rarely a whisper about responsibility. When individuals place “rights” above the 
welfare and concem for others, they make the most grievous of all errors, that of 
trying to be a moral exception. This is not to say that individual rights and 
liberties are unimportant. On the contrary, but rights claimed and liberties 
demanded is a one-sided logic counter to the concept of “respect for all”.
We all make declarations and contentions about “our” rights. Very often the
debate ends up with the “claims that whatever right is under discussion at the
moment trumps every other consideration” (Glendon 1991, 8). ' Many times we
do so without discussing the implications of these claims and the ultimate fallout
associated with the positions taken. “My rights” are of extreme importance in
the discussion, whereas “your rights” are important only as long as they do not
compete with “my rights”! The assertion of rights may be made by individuals,
or by groups on behalf of individuals. They can be discussed in a framework
that is legal or ethical, and the goal of any group attempting to assert a right is
that there is established a legal framework within which to assert that right,
thereby giving a certain amount of justification for the assertion. This framework
10
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may use arguments that are thought of as prima facie, or “on the face of it”, and 
that will require no further explanation other than the stating o f the right and the 
claim of the “human experience”. Some of these will be asserted as “natural” or 
“God given”, those that cannot be taken away regardless of that which befalls 
the offended individual. A common question asked about the existence of 
fundamental moral rights may be answered by the simple reasoning from the 
facts of human nature (Wellman 1985,170-71).  ^ Certain facts about human 
nature, that all human beings seek to prolong life and shun injury or pain, seem 
to imply, de facto , that all humans have a natural right to life and a moral right 
not to be injured.
Natural Rights
Natural Rights have always been In the background for scholars and 
individuals in their declarations of rights. They have been called 'inalienable', 
“fundamental”, ‘common’, and even “divine” rights. Thomas Jefferson in his 
writing of the Declaration of Independence based the entire document on the 
concept that all men are “endowed by their creator with certain inalienable 
rights;... life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. T he  term ‘natural rights’ is 
generally restricted to those [rights] which are conceived of as more 
fundamental than others, from which the others may be deduced, or to which 
the others are only auxiliary” (Ritchie 1952, 80-81). ^
The defense of the natural rights is easier in a group. When a man is 
attacked and his life is in jeopardy, is it not easier to defend one’s life with the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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help of others? Men bind together in commonwealths for “the foresight of their 
own preservation”, the protection of their most basic natural right, that of life 
itself (Hobbes 1651, Chap. 17). *
Much of the grounding for the assertion of rights for individuals lies in the 
philosophical case for the concept of rights claims. Self preservation, that of the 
continuation of life, is one of the pillars in the rights discussions.
Thomas Hobbes stated that, “Man has, through the use of his own power 
and will, the freedom to preserve his own nature; that is to say of his own life; 
and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own judgment, and reason, 
shall conceive to be the [means of the preservation]” (Hobbes 1651, Chap. 14).  ^
For Hobbes the issue that made it a fundamental natural right was that man was 
also bound and forbidden to do “that, which was destructive of his life.” The 
endeavor to be and to continue to be is not granted by human artifice but is 
natural to all living beings. He believed that man had the right to his life 
(nature) and was bound by the law of nature in the preservation of that life. 
Hobbes also professed to a natural equality among men. By equality he meant, 
not just physical equality (which he often acknowledged as a false assumption), 
but in aspects of power relative to a consensual social contract. That is, we are 
equal in that no one of us is willing to go without consideration, and anyone can 
be outdone by others if this is allowed. Hobbes claimed that moral action, and 
constraint, is only possible as long as this “political equality” existed. Hobbes 
continues with the community' aspects that appear to be so important. Civil
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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rights pertain to the concept of community, or to use Hobbes’ term: 
commonwealth. These, unlike natural rights, are granted by mutual agreement.
As a result of man's formation of the commonwealth, the power behind the 
individual in the enforcement of the natural rights and civil rights (the covenants, 
or agreements among men, for Hobbes) become instituted.
The concept of ‘social contract' does have its limitations. What happens 
when a man refuses to submit to the social collective will, To march to the beat 
of a different drummer”, if you will? The distinction must be drawn between 
Natural rights and Civil rights. While the line is wide and gray, it nevertheless 
does exist and is the basis for much of the law in the world today. Natural rights 
pertain to man in his person or existence; the right of a man to be secure in his 
intellect, to act as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, but always 
with the respectful awareness that his actions are not injurious to others and 
their (equal) natural rights. The natural rights of man cannot be taken from him. 
The power of the intellect, the rights of the mind, his religious beliefs, self- 
preservation, are all within the power of the individual; these he never 
surrenders. These ‘natural rights' when asserted as a group and 
acknowledged by the group as rights that are applicable to all is a basis on 
which the group of civil rights is then made enforceable by laws. Many would 
argue that this community of rights is a natural and obvious evolution of the 
nature of things and the often sought pursuit of happiness.
A collateral condition of the pursuit of happiness, not made by Hobbes 
except as a generality, is the concept of man having his basic needs met
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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without restriction and to not be subjected to gratuitous pain or suffering. The 
concept of basic needs includes the right to adequate food, water, clothing, 
shelter, and medical treatments. (Hobbes 1651, Chap. 27). " The issue of not 
merely suffering pain is simply regarded as benign treatment by others. This 
will all fall into the Hobbesian definition or classification of the broad concept of 
justice. These are the common core or the fundamental rights that all human 
creatures experience. Michael Freemen notes that these rights are a 
fundamental part of the human experience and that the denial of these rights is 
a direct affront to the concept of being human: Those rights cannot be denied 
without a potentially critical loss of what constitutes being human" (Ritchie, 27). 
This holistic view of the human condition regarding natural rights is consistent 
with the views expressed by Hobbes, but carries with it a form to be considered; 
to wit, that a basic part of being human is an essential right to “a hope by their 
industry” of obtaining the aforementioned fundamental human needs, wants, 
eurid desires (Hobbes 1651, Chap. 13). '  These are an essential part of the 
human organism and cannot be denied, neglected, or rejected by anyone least 
of all the individual himself.
Natural rights, as shown by Hobbes, cannot be given to or taken from the 
individual, regardless of the circumstances. The most essential element for the 
purposes of this essay is the concept of life and the protection of that life. As we 
have shown, life is a right which man may defend under all offenses designed 
to relieve him of that right. But the concept of 'natural rights' is not without its 
detractors, and Jeremy Bentham was one of the most eloquent.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Jeremy Bentham
Bentham rejected the concept of natural rights as an elusive concept created 
by man. When a man asserts he has natural rights he creates a situation where 
he expresses a need for some consideration relative to his life and possible 
happiness. His inability to express this need in any tangible way gives rise to 
the claim of natural rights: when a man has no political power in his possession 
or no support of the political system, he asserts he has a natural right. He 
creates a reason for the wanting or wishing for natural rights, the want of 
happiness. He may also assert his 'natural rights' when faced with the 
elements of oppression, injustice, or tyranny. But merely wishing that 
something is true or real does not make it so; "\vishings for rights, are not rights;
- a reason for wishing that a certain right were established, is not that right - 
want is not supply - hunger is not bread” (Bentham, 1843). * The argument can 
be persuasive, though. When a man has been beaten out of political grounding 
for his rights assertion he will cling to the thread of natural right, “that which has 
been bestowed by that kind goddess and govemess of Nature, an Indisputable 
legitimacy. If he can convince you, or get you to acknowledge, the existence of 
this or that 'natural righf” he has “the hope of getting you to acknowledge the 
existence of a corresponding political right, and in getting your assistance in 
enabling him to posses it” (Ogden 1932, 121). *
Rights do not stand alone for Bentham. Obligations are an integral part of the 
equation that must be accounted for. Bentham stated that, “for every right which 
the law confers on one party....it thereby imposes on some other party a duty or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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obligation” (Bentham, 1789). "  For Bentham, rights and obligations must go
hand-in-hand. Those charged with the handing out of these corresponding
benefits and burdens must be aware that any conference of rights in the interest
of liberty also is a restriction of the same concept. “According to the principle of
utility [a legislator] ought never to impose a burden except for the purpose of
conferring a benefit of a clearly greater value. It is impossible to create rights, to
impose obligations, to protect the person, life, reputation, property, substance,
liberty itself, except at the expense of liberty.” “The law [govemment] cannot
create rights except by creating corresponding obligations. It cannot create
rights and obligations without creating offenses, it cannot command nor forbid
without restraining the liberty of individuals. It appears, then, the citizen cannot
acquire rights except by sacrificing a part of his liberty” (Bentham 1864). "
Some may confuse this with Hobbes. When Hobbes spoke of man losing his
liberty, he was speaking of “laying down” or giving up a right; thereby divesting
himself of the liberty. Bentham, on the other hand, was speaking of the
acquisition of rights, thereby creating obligations and offenses, leading to the
loss of liberty. Bentham's argument that rights can only be conferred by positive
law neglects the issues of what it is to be fundamentally human:
You hear a multitude of professors, of jurists,... of philosophers, who 
make the laws o f nature echo in your ears. ... The phrase is sometimes 
modified, and we find in its place, natural right, natural equity, the rights 
o f man, etc. They are, at the bottom, only the arbitrary principle.... The 
object is, to make our opinions triumph without the trouble of comparing 
them with the opinions of others. ...It is no longer the moral sense- it is the 
common sense... and common sense is a sense which belongs to 
everybody; [and] then he will take good care in speaking for everybody 
[and] make no account of those who do not think as he does (Bentham 
1864). ’2
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This strong criticism of natural rights is extreme, even for Bentham, but does 
show the fervor with which the rights argument is often put forward and 
attacked. He neglects the issues of human self-preservation and the natural 
instinctive traits this self defense invokes. Contemporary philosophers have 
continued in the discussion, but much current work is an examination of the 
interdependency of rights and responsibilities. One leading example is the 
work of Mary Ann Glendon.
Glendon and the Communitarians 
Contemporary Viewpoints 
Natural Rights are also asserted to have a form of precision or finality in the 
discussion, if I have a 'natural right* then there is nothing you or anyone else 
can do to relieve me of that right. Mary Ann Glendon asserts: T he exaggerated 
absoluteness of our American rights rhetoric is closely bound up with its other 
distinctive traits—a near-silence concerning responsibility, and a tendency to 
envision the rights-bearer as a lone autonomous individual" (Glendon 1991,
45). This silence concerning responsibility is a  concept that weakens any talk of 
‘inalienable’ rights. If the concept of natural or inalienable rights is to survive, 
then the concept of responsibility must also play in the discussion. One cannot 
confer preference without conferring a corresponding limitation. Glendon 
continues with, "people are well aware of their rights but fail to grasp the other 
half of the democratic equation... [that of] meeting personal responsibilities, 
serving the community, and participating in the nation’s political life" (Glendon
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1991, 76). The concept of community service and community standards 
regarding moral codes brings in an argument for a community perspective.
The seeking of the ‘common good’ is the gauge that is used when the 
community examines moral codes and rights that seek to be upheld. This might 
be the Supreme Good, as in the polis fo r Aristotle, the ‘most good’ for the 
utilitarian; but the focus and definition o f the moral good outlined here is really 
not at stake. What is the issue is the assertion of rights and obligations by 
individuals that conflict with the common good, however it is defined. “A true 
moral right is one that is demonstrably justifiable by relation to the common 
good, whether it is actually recognized or not [and]... Individual[s] have no 
moral rights which conflict with the common good" (Hobhouse 1965, 40). [For 
the purposes of this thesis we will stipulate that the issues of tyranny, 
oppression and injustice can only be classified as "against" the common good 
and can only be viewed as moral evils ]
In this way, the common good’ can become a general common ground for 
coordinating rights with duties. One can argue that the education of school 
children serves the common good, that a national patriotism also serves this 
aim; each may have a certain function to perform thereby creating an obligation 
of society to facilitate or maintain conditions under which these functions can 
best be fulfilled. Rights, as they have come to be understood, have an 
individualistic tone that makes them inconsistent with the community aspects on 
which we all depend.
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And a community may be said to exert a form of its own rights.
Communitarian philosophy has "made the question of balance between 
individual rights and social responsibility, between autonomy and the common 
good, a major concern". Amitai Etzioni, a strong voice in the Communitarian 
movement, states that “there is a gap between rights and rightness that cannot 
be closed without a richer moral vocabulary - one that invokes principles of 
decency, duty, responsibility, and the common good, among others” (Etzioni 
1998, xi). A right to the freedom of speech does not make all forms of speech 
‘right speech’. A right to shout ‘nigger* at African Americans, or ‘Jew* at those of 
Jewish descent, does not make it a right thing to do. The corresponding right 
also does not give the holder a "sufficient reason to perform" that right (Etzioni 
1998, xxxiii).
Autonomy
Arguments about autonomy often involve solely-individual thinking but may
also be seen to involve community rights via the preservation of choices for the
commonwealth. As we have stated, individual moral rights cannot conflict with
the community of good, but part of the community of good may be said to
involve individual freedoms and control.
Around the core of any ethical right clusters an assortment of 
associated ethical liberties, claims, powers and immunities. What ties 
these ethical elements together into a single right is the way in which 
each associated element contributes some sort of freedom or 
control... with respect to the possessor of the right. Because freedom 
and control are two aspects of autonomy, any ethical right can be 
thought of as a system of ethical autonomy (Wellman 1985, 329).
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Problematic to the whole discussion of autonomy is the question where to 
draw the line between individual autonomy, the rights associated with this 
concept, and the point where the "allowance" of these rights infringes on the 
rights of others, on the/r autonomous individuality? The respect for the 
autonomous individual is central to the good that will be derived from this 
respect for the whole of the community group. If you respect my autonomy now, 
then when the time comes, I will respect yours. What I do not say at this point in 
my assertion of these rights is that my respect then, will be predicated on the 
concept of your not violating any of my perceived rights at that time. This 
collective benefit that is asserted is often termed a form of social contract or 
agreement by which persons live within a community.
This sense of autonomy, or the ability of individuals to be masters of their 
own fate or to control their own destiny, is essential to the formation of rights by 
both individuals and groups. The problem with (literally) autonomous decision 
making is the ability of the individual (or group working on behalf of the 
individual) to neglect a sense of fairness with respect to other individuals. 
Respect for the individual is not lost with the medical community and the 
autonomous patient is at the forefront of many medical ethics discussions. This 
will involve many issues, one of which is patient decision making and control 
over decisions that were historically left to a more paternalistic physician 
community. Patient autonomy has left the medical community with a patient 
population that is more informed (whether actually or legally informed) and
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prepared, no, really, demanding, to have a say in the care that they receive or 
do not receive, and who does or does not provide the care.
Autonomy is an issue central to health care and will never be out of the 
discussion as it is a basic tenet afforded to patients. Part of the discussion of 
autonomy is within the disability rights issues that arise out of the concept of the 
infected individual health care workers who are also at the same time "patients" 
in their own right - and who therefore are afforded all of the same rights as other 
patients (i.e. autonomy, confidentiality, privacy, etc.). The control discussed 
earlier is a legal ability on the part of the claimant to force compliance with the 
asserted right thereby affirming an ethical autonomy for the individual.
Conclusion
As we have already shown, one cannot create or assert the concept of 
‘rights’ without assigning, creating, and obligating responsibilities.
Responsibility places each member of the community in a ‘double relation’. "He 
has a share in it. That is the sum of his rights. He has to contribute his share. 
That is the sum of his duties. Rights and duties thus rest on the same ethical 
foundation" (Hobhouse 1965, 39).
The issues of the rights for the infected health care workers will also focus on 
existing political rights that have been clearly established. Currently, as we 
shall see, there are strong protections for the infected individuals under existing 
disability laws. Yet, while the protections are powerful, the laws are not without 
areas of dispute or areas that are vague and ambiguous. This scenario will
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always lead to judicial challenges to the laws, or claims and assertions made in 
court settings that are not definitely within the scope of the law, but were "clearly 
within the spirit of the law”. The disabled individuals within our society have, as 
of late, begun to receive what has been considered to be their appropriate 
participatory societal opportunities. These disabled ‘rights' have been at the 
forefront of recent legislation, namely the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
many a case is pending in the court systems of this nation with the assertion of 
these new  ‘rights'. The courts have been challenged in the enforcement of 
these ‘rights' and in their efforts to achieve a sense of equity for these 
individuals often create a form of common law that augments or modifies the 
ambiguous laws handed down from the legislature. While the issues of the law 
pertain to the rights of these individuals, they are better reviewed within the 
realm of a discussion on justice than on rights. (See Chapter 7)
Any argument by surgeons in favor of any "right” that does not accept the 
necessary responsibilities that correspond to that right on the other side of the 
spectrum, will fail. Patients subjected to potential grievous harm by the 
assertion of the rights of the physician, without the patients’ consent, will 
ultimately fall victim to the rights debate. One could fall back to a Hobbesian 
analysis and say this would violate the patient’s right to self preservation by 
placing the physician’s rights above his or hers with the result being a loss of 
the patient’s life. Physicians seeking to advance their own rights over those of 
the patient, particularly at the expense of the patient’s well-being, will lose the
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trust of a public, already unsympathetic to the rights of wealthy individuals who, 
at least perceptually, may be viewed as only seeking to preserve their wealth.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
Chapter Notes
1. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk, The Impoverishment o f 
Political Discourse, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 8.
2. Carl Wellman, A Theory o f Rights, Person under Laws, Institutions, and 
Morals, (New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 170-71.
3. David G. Ritchie, Natural Rights, A Criticism o f some Political and 
Ethical Conceptions, Fifth Impression, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952), 
80-81.
4. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: A.R. 
Mowbray & Co., 1955) Chap. 17, 109 [Grig. pub. 1651].
5. Ibid., Chap. 14, 84.
6. Ibid., Chap. 27, 197.
7. Ibid., Chap. 13, 84.
8. Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. II, ed. John 
Bowring, (London, 1843), 501. Quoted in Abraham Edel, Elizabeth Flower, 
Finbarr W. O'Connor, Morality, Philosophy, and Practice, Historical and 
Contemporary Readings and Studies, (New York: Random House, 1989), 297, 
As quoting Jeremy Bentham from the essay Anarchical Fallacies.
9. Charles K. Ogden, Bentham’s Theory o f Fictions, (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co., 1932), 121.
10. See notes: Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, (1789), eds. J.H. Bums, H.LA. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970), 206.
11. Jeremy Bentham. Theory o f Legislation, (1864), ed. Charles K. Odgen, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932), Quoted in Morris R. Cohen, and 
Felix S. Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1951), 606-607.
12. Ibid., 602-603.
13. Leonard T. Hobhouse, The Elements o f Social Justice, (London: Ruskin 
House, George Allen & Unwin, 1965), 40.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
14. Amitai Etzioni, éd., The Essential Communitarian Reader, (Maryland: 
Roman & Littlefield. 1998), introduction xi.
15. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. 101-336.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3 
DISABIUTY LAW
With almost as much fervor and passion as was exhibited in the 1960s in the 
battle of minority citizens for their civil rights, the 1990s has become the 
battleground for the disabled. The difference between the two issues is wide 
but the approach and subsequent confrontations in and out of the courtroom are 
inexorably linked. This chapter will examine the current disability laws that exist 
and the areas of each that are applicable to the AIDS afflicted individual. Terms 
used in the laws are similar. Specifically we will concentrate on what 
constitutes disability, the otherwise qualified' and direct threat’ portions of 
these laws, and examine the concept of risk regarding infected healthcare 
providers. We will also explore some of the case law that has been handed 
down by the courts regarding these persons, and examine policy positions 
taken as a result of this case law.
The disabled individual, classically, has been viewed as one who, through
some unfortunate accident either from birth, trauma, or other mishap, has been
rendered less than ‘complete’ (or less than ‘perfect’) as an organism. The result
of this perception is that, for years the "imperfect” individuals of our society were
sheltered or shut away from the mainstream of the population. This was done
for many reasons and is grounded in the long tradition of humanity, in some
26
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ancient cultures "deformed infants were sometimes slain as monstrous; even in 
such advanced societies as that of ancient Greece, the abandonment of infants 
could be tolerated." ' This has been a common practice in many civilizations 
where the survival of the tribe or clan was dependent on the overall health and 
strength of tribal members. When an individual became a burden on others, 
they were cast aside and left to fend for themselves. For the elderly and the 
disabled or sickly, this was often a death sentence. This still occurs in the 
modem world. While this historical background is not essential to this particular 
study, the wide swing of the proverbial pendulum may have come back to haunt 
those that would have considered the disabled as anything less than 
‘complete’. This sense of ‘completeness’ was true of the civil rights movement 
with formation of the concept of affirmative action, and it will also be true with the 
treatment of the disabled in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and more recent the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [ADA]. '  The broad implications that 
have arisen since the passage of these two key pieces of legislation will impact 
society for many years to come. As will be seen in the pages to come, just as 
the civil rights movement sought to raise the social conscience regarding 
African Americans and wound up with an broad minority definition that Included 
women, Hispanics and others; so the quest for the rights o f the disabled will 
see the broad sweep of the brush of inclusion regarding what is, and is not, 
handicapped. No longer will disabled status apply only to the victim of cerebral 
palsy or the wheelchair-bound accident victim. The concept of disability will 
include those with unseen disabilities. People with mental handicaps.
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recovering abusers of both alcohol and drugs, persons with communicable 
diseases, in fact, any person who has a physical or mental problem that 
"substantially limits one or more of his/her major life activities" is now 
considered disabled. This determination allows unique protection and special 
treatment under the current laws of the nation much as the actions created by 
the civil rights movement were used to correct past injustices.
Much could be written on this broad subject and the need to narrow the focus 
for this work seems essential. Current discussion will concentrate on the 
unseen disability of the communicable disease and the impact on society for 
providing inclusion regarding this type of individual. This is not meant to be a 
sociological discussion, merely an examination of the evolution for inclusion of 
these afflicted individuals on the nature of ‘disability’, and how that was 
accomplished through the current legislation and subsequent court challenges 
that have arisen. This work will attempt to examine these issues and will 
concentrate on the effect that this determination will have on Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome-afflicted individuals, specifically the approach to the AIDS 
afflicted surgeon and student and their ability to participate in health care 
programs. ®
The beginning of the disability revolution started with the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 which states in section 504 (hereinafter, “section 504") that:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States... 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or 
activity conducted by any Executive Agency.
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The key wording of "otherwise qualified" is a phrase that means to set aside the
affliction of the individual and examine his status of performance if he were not
so afflicted. If the individual is "otherwise qualified" then he must be afforded
the opportunity to participate irrespective of his handicap. Section 504 is limited
in its jurisdiction. The limitation involves activities that receive federal funding or
are actual programs sponsored by a govemmental or executive agency.
Implementation and jurisdiction over the act fell to the U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (later transferred to the Department of Health
and Human Services in 1980) which issues the implementation regulations.
The determination of what constitutes a handicapped person is generally
defined in both the act and section 504 to mean:
Any person who (i)has a physical or mental impairment which substantially 
limits one or more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an 
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. *
The regulations further define the terminology of ‘physical or mental
impairment" to be:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including 
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; 
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or 
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain 
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. ^
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome falls under the Act in the physiology of 
the immune system which is a part of the lymphatic system. The definition will 
also cover persons who test positive for the virus but who have not presented 
with symptoms. The inclusion of ‘asymptomatic’ individuals is a wide step from
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the traditional concept of ‘disabled* and a clear expansion of the classical 
interpretation.
The first challenge to the provision of the Act on the basis of contagious 
disease involved a schoolteacher in Florida who sued the local school board for 
discrimination based on Section 504. In School Board o f Nassau County v. 
Arline (1987), the local school board attempted to terminate the employment of 
a classroom teacher with TB. " Gene Arline, the school teacher, claimed 
handicapped status under the provisions of the Section 504 and sued for 
unlawful discharge. At the District Court level the plaintiffs motion was denied 
with the court stating that It was "difficult... to conceive that Congress intended 
contagious disease to be included within the definition of a handicapped 
person" (Tumer 1988, 2, 23).  ^ That finding was overturned by the Court of 
Appeals which stated that the Section 504 clearly included individuals with a 
contagious disease but remanded the case for additional finding on the status 
of Arline’s risk of (cross) infection and of that risk, precluding the plaintiff from 
being "otherwise qualified" (11th Cir. 1984). ® This also brought in the issue of 
the school board being able to make "reasonable accommodation" for the 
plaintiff to resume her duties as a classroom teacher. In a landmark decision in 
Arline (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals 
should be affirmed and that the plaintiff was a handicapped individual under the 
meaning of Section 504. Writing for the seven-justice majority. Justice Brennan 
spoke of protecting the handicapped not only from simple prejudice, but from 
“archaic attitudes and laws" (Tumer 1988, 2 ,1 ).
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The Supreme Court used the general definition of handicapped individual in
assessing the plaintiffs case and found (i) that one or more of her major life
activities were limited, due to her earlier hospitalizations for said disease, and
(ii) that this clearly established that the plaintiff had a record of such an
impairment. The justices further assessed the plaintiff for the physiological
inclusion under section 504 and clearly found that the plaintiffs tuberculosis
clearly constitutes a respiratory condition. In its arguments before the Court, the
school board conceded that contagious disease could fall under the stipulations
of Section 504, but further argued that this was irrelevant since the plaintiff had
not been discharged for having the condition, but for the threat that she posed to
others. This was dismissed by Brennan and the Court as more of the same
prejudiced, ignorant attitudes and fears. It did move the Court to attempt to
determine if the plaintiff is "otherwise qualified " and if the school board should
be required to adopt an accommodation for the handicapped individual. These
further fact findings were remanded to the district court who adopted a set of
factors presented by the American Medical Association (hereinafter, AM A). In
an amicus curiae ("friend of the court") brief, the AMA stated the assessment
should be based on:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of 
the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what 
is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities the disease 
will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm (Tumer 1988, 2, 
2).
The criterion sought by the court, and eventually adopted by the Supreme 
Court, was if the individual offers a significant risk and that reasonable
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accommodation will not eliminate the risk, then the individual is not “othenwise 
qualified” under Section 504. Brennan wrote, “ the fact that some persons who 
have contagious disease may pose a threat to others under certain 
circumstances does not justify excluding from coverage of the Act all persons 
with actual or perceived contagious diseases” (Tumer 1988, 2, 2).
As a result of this decision by the Court, the US Solicitor General, also in an 
amicus curiae brief, raised the question as to whether a person can be 
contagious without having a physical impairment and could this ever constitute 
discrimination based on handicap? The Court skirted the issue stating that the 
argument was misplaced since the facts in Arline had given rise to a physical 
impairment. As a result of this judgment by the Court and its apparent 
reluctance to take a stand on the issue of asymptomatic AIDS patients.
Congress moved swiftly to, in essence, legislatively reverse the Court. In a 
proposed amendment to the Civil Rights Restoration Act (hereinafter, CRRA), 
which had passed by overriding a presidential veto. Senators Tom Harkin and 
Gordon Humphrey introduced the concept of “direct threat” . The amendment 
states:
...Section 504 does not include those who, because of a contagious 
disease, “would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other 
individuals” (Gerry 1988, 182). •
The Senators were quick to add in the discussion that the amendment would
not change the current law regarding “reasonable accommodation”. The
problem with this amendment to the CRRA is that it left the possibility of broad
judicial interpretation of the “direct threat” language and, depending on the level
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of judicial scrutiny applied to an individual case, might find certain persons 
outside the scope of Section 504. The implication is clear and the inference is 
strong that persons with HIV or AIDS might be left out (Gerry 1988, 183). The 
courts were soon to solve this very problem.
Even though the Supreme Court had opted not to decide the issue of 
discrimination involving the AIDS afflicted individual the year before, the 
decision in Arline was a clear guideline for the treatment of all individuals with a 
contagious disease.
In Chalk v. United States District Court (1987) this exact issue was brought 
before the bench. The issues in Chalk are much of the same issues raised in 
Arline, but the difference is that it involved the AIDS virus and factors in all of the 
paranoia, prejudice, and hysteria that has surrounded this disease. The courts 
have, in certain instances, participated in this hysteria. In fact the whole basis 
for Chaik involves a propagation of this hysteria. Vincent Chalk, a teacher of 
hearing-impaired students, was removed from his classroom duties by his 
employer (and offered an administrative position) due to the fear of apparent 
risk Chalk imposed. In the district court, the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary 
injunction barring his employer from excluding him from the classroom was 
denied. While the presiding judge stated that he believed that the plaintiff could 
ultimately win the case, he also stated that his own skepticism and uncertainty 
regarding the current state of medical knowledge with respect to AIDS resulted 
in the denial of the plaintiffs plea to the court for relief. He wrote:
It seems to me the problem is that we simply do not know enough about 
AIDS to be completely certain. ...and I do not in any sense mean to be an
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alarmist... I think i f  s too early to draw a definite conclusion ...about the 
extent of the risk (Tumer 1988,3,3-4).
The judge further stated that there was a significant risk of transmission at some
point, because of the “almost inevitable mutation" of the virus (Turner 1988,
notes, 33,28). The district court further stated that the plaintiff had failed to
show that he had suffered irreparable injury (due to the fact that he had been
offered an administrative position without loss of income or benefits), and that
the teacher's injury was ‘outweighed by the fear* likely to be produced in the
classroom.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court ruling. In regard to the 
plaintiffs pleadings, the court ruled that the district court had failed to follow the 
guidelines set forth in Section 504 and the those in Arline. While addressing 
many of the issues in Arline, the district court had failed to follow the precedent 
set in Arline and had improperly shifted the burden of proof (regarding apparent 
risk) to the plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit stated that “little in science can be proved 
with complete certainty, and Sec. 504 does not require such a test." It further 
reasoned that the lower court had ‘improperly relied on speculation and had 
rejected the overwhelming consensus of medical opinion' (Tumer 1988, 3, 4).
The appeals court decision was not without other case law to support the 
issues in the classroom. During this time there were many cases that had 
appeared on the court dockets that involved school children, afflicted with the 
aids virus, being allowed to attend regular classroom instruction. The clear 
difference between these cases and Chalk is not the science but the 
jurisdiction. School children, specifically handicapped children, are covered
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under a separate piece of legislation than was to be applied to the decision in 
Chalk. This difference in jurisdiction did not matter to the court as the 
assessment of the risk would be the same, teacher or student. "
The issues in the Arline and Chalk decisions confirmed that the issue of 
AIDS would be covered in the language of Section 504, but the impact of AIDS 
afflicted individuals participating in much of the benefits of society would not be 
without its limitations. In the employment and education contexts, all casual 
contact is ruled out as a contributing factor, and the ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ language applied to all handicapped individuals. This would 
not go without a rigorous test in other areas.
Even though the issues appeared clear regarding employment and school 
attendance, other factors came into play when the issues came into the health 
care area, in both the employment and education settings. While it has been a 
creed of the health care practitioner to help, treat, and when possible cure the 
disease ridden and injured patient, the AIDS afflicted individual raised a 
concern among health care workers that was already sweeping the country.
While I will not attempt to argue for the AIDS patient in the context of patient 
rights to adequate health care (as that is a subject for another forum), the 
general ethical stand is that a ll patients have a right to receive treatment, 
regardless of the nature of their individual affliction. This treatment includes for 
the patient the tenet of “keeping them from harm" in the course of their treatment 
(Edwards and Graber 1988, 40). Health care providers must address the 
issue of AIDS affliction within their own ranks and assess the problems that this
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creates. The issue spans both the employment and education spectrums and 
the issues are unfolding even as this thesis goes to print.
In the case of William Behringer, M.D. v. The Medical Center at Princeton 
(1991), "  a New Jersey court upheld a medical center's right to restrict surgical 
privileges of an HIV positive physician. The way that this case developed and 
the resulting decision regarding breach of confidentiality of information and a 
disabled person's rights are important to the issues being raised. While the 
issues of confidentiality are not central to this discussion, the resultant actions 
are. William Behringer was a practicing surgeon at the Princeton Medical 
Center who sought and received medical treatment for an undisclosed 
condition. In the course of the treatment and inpatient stay at the medical 
center, the physician was diagnosed as being HIV positive and through a lack 
of structured policy regarding the confidentiality of such information, this 
knowledge was communicated to the staff of the medical center. The issue may 
not have been a problem for the average patient, but the fact that the patient 
was a member of the medical staff led the court to determine that the hospital’s 
confidentiality policy was insufficient to protect the rights of ALL patients. When 
the information reached the president of the medical center, Mr. Dennis Doody, 
he immediately suspended the physician’s surgical privileges by canceling all 
pending surgeries planned by Dr. Behringer. While the doctor privately notified 
the Chief of Surgery of his diagnosis, he stated that he wished to continue his 
practice of surgery.
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The position taken by the surgeon in question and the then current (1987) 
information from the public health agencies was placed before several 
committees and was ultimately passed on to the Board of Trustees of the 
medical center. The issues presented to the Board involved the facts that there 
were no known cases of transmission of the HIV virus from infected providers to 
patients, and that the public health agencies recommended that “Individualized 
decisions” should be made regarding the continued practice of infected 
providers. The Board concluded after examining all the issues presented and 
assessing the ambiguity of the public health recommendations (that of stating 
that “operating room precautions were expected to prevent HIV transmission”), 
and the concerns of the hospital's president and legal departments regarding 
the reputation of the medical center and the litigation possibilities due to the 
public fear of AIDS (reasonable or not), that adopting a policy of requiring 
patient informed consent would be the best course of action. The policy would 
require that all patients preparing to undergo surgery by an HIV positive 
surgeon, be informed, in writing, about this status. While adopting this policy for 
the protection of the institution, all parties involved in the decision agreed that 
“in the absence of patients willing to undergo invasive procedures by HIV 
positive surgeons, this was a ‘de facto prohibition' from surgical practice” 
(McIntyre 1991, 8).
Dr. Behringer sued for damages for two separate and distinct issues: 1 ) that 
the hospital had failed in its duty to protect the confidentiality of patient 
information and 2) that as a result of the subsequent policy conditions on his
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practice of surgery he was discriminated against in a violation of the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination. ^  Dr. Behringer claimed that the medical 
center’s breach of confidentiality of his HIV status had the result that “his ability 
to practice was impaired, so significantly, that his medical practice was 
damaged, if not destroyed”. The court found for the plaintiff in the argument of 
confidentiality of information and determined that the Medical Center was liable 
for damages.
On the issue of the policy conditions regarding his right to practice surgery, 
the court took a stand that has been a hallmark for health care providers who 
perform invasive procedures. The court used many pieces of information in 
formulating its decision. It was determined that surgeons (and dental 
practitioners) frequently injure their fingers in the course of providing treatment. 
“Most injuries are minor, but severe and unusual injuries sometimes do occur” 
and surgical glove cuts and cuts to the fingers, while not common place, were 
not unheard of (Keyes 1989,19).
This issue-whether or not AIDS afflicted health care providers or students in 
the health sciences should be allowed to practice or train in the discipline-is a 
problem that has been characterized as a “witch hunt” by some and a necessity 
by others. The Center for Disease Control (hereinafter CDC) has specific 
guidelines for the treatment of the AIDS afflicted patient and for the treatment of 
the health care worker (hereinafter HCW) afflicted with the AIDS virus. The use 
of “Universal Precautions” has been recommended against blood and other 
body secretions by the use of gloves, masks, gowns, eye protection and other
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methods of ‘barrier protection’. Many of these have been used since the early 
days of infection control, particularly in the surgical theater. These original 
precautions were for the protection of the patient, most health care providers, 
outside the operating room, merely used ‘good hand washing' as the best 
defense against contracting disease from the patient. Routine patient contact 
was considered casual contact and the skin provided adequate barrier from the 
vast majority of patient conditions, with specific exceptions. From a patient care 
standpoint, the CDC responded in 1985 with guidelines stressing the use of the 
universal precautions with all patients with whom there is a chance of contact 
with blood or other infectious body fluids. In other words, all patients are to be 
considered infected until proven otherwise.
With regard to infected HCWs several studies, all of them retrospective In
nature, have been performed. Most of these have involved ‘look-back*
statistical examinations of the patients of AIDS afflicted surgeons. Without
going into the analysis of the data, much that has been concluded is that
“although a precise, quantifiable risk to patients (from undergoing surgical
procedures by AIDS infected health care workers) is not yet possible, the risk is
most likely quite low" (Barnes, et. al., 1990, 313). Responding to the potential
for HCW to patient transmission the CDC guidelines in 1985 also stated:
[A] risk of transmission of (AIDS) infection from HCWs to patients 
would exist in situations where there is both (1) a high degree 
trauma to the patient that would provide a portal of entry for the 
virus (e.g., during invasive proc^ures) and (2) access of blood or 
serous fluid from the infected HCW to the open tissue of the 
patient, as would occur if the HCW sustained a needlestick or 
scalpel injury during an invasive procedure. (CDC 1985) '®
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This determination of a potential risk to patients from HIV infected HCWs 
performing invasive procedures was a profound statement considering that the 
only clearly identified infectious risk to patients, and one that medicine has 
diligently fought to minimize since the discovery in the early days of surgery, 
was bacterial infection.
In the 1985 guidelines the CDC also stated that testing of HCWs performing 
invasive procedures should be considered and there was no clear reason to 
restrict HIV infected HCWs from performing non-invasive procedures “unless 
they have evidence of other infection or illness for (which they) should be 
restricted". This apparent restriction is to protect the HIV infected HCW as these 
conditions are immunosuppressive in nature and the risk to the immune 
suppressed HCW from ill and infectious (other than HIV) patients is increased. 
This has been one of the major complaints from HCWs regarding all of the 
fervor regarding patient risk.
Medicine traditionally has been in the forefront in the battle to prevent the 
patient from acquiring so called “in-house” infections. Aseptic technique is 
religiously followed and the general consensus among HCWs is that real risk is 
not to the patients but to the workers. While all of this may be true for the 
patients- that the risk to the patient of not having the invasive procedure or of 
expiring from the procedure itself (almost all invasive procedures of a surgical 
nature carry a mortality risk of one form or another) is profoundly greater than 
acquiring an infection from the HCW- this does not change the political wind 
which often blows the way of public opinion.
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In Behringer, the plaintiff argued that “ the risk of transmission of HIV to [aj
patient is too remote...” (McIntyre 1991,8). Aside from this, the case still
remains that there is a ‘potential risk’ of transmission to the patient. The
American Medical Association (AMA) in response to the CDC issued its own
guidelines in 1988 for the employment of the HIV infected physician. The
guidelines are fraught with ambiguities. This is probably due to the fact that
there is no general agreement among physicians as to the real risk. But the
ethical message is clear. It states:
patients are entitled to expect that their physicians will not increase their 
exposure to the risk of contracting an infectious disease, even 
minimally... if a risk does exist, the physician should not engage in the 
activity (JAMA 1988).
The AMA followed these guidelines in 1991 with an affirmation of this policy by 
stating that:
...the “medical profession... should err on the side of protecting 
patients” and that HIV infected physicians “have an ethical 
obligation not to engage in any professional practice which has an 
identifiable risk of transmission” to the patients (AMA 1991). ”
This “no identifiable risk” standard set forth by the AMA is not clearly thought 
out and is not universally applied. A “no risk” standard is a standard that is not 
attainable. At any one time all health care workers are infected either with 
simple colds or other viral infections that will have little impact on a patient’s 
health, or with infections or bacteria that are considered indigenous or normal to 
the body. The standard sets even minimal or remote danger levels that may 
disqualify all providers. This was never the intent of the AMA and the 
enforcement of these guidelines and its ‘non-application’ of these standards
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(the stumbling block used is the debate over Hepatitis Infected providers) to the
aforementioned disabilities (as classed by Sec. 504) places the AIDS infection
at a h/gher standard than other disabilities. This may be inconsistent with the
amicus curiae brief submitted by the AM A and used in the Ariine decision. It
might also be inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause and may not satisfy the minimum scrutiny of a differential rational basis
test. If two groups are to be treated differently (infected vs. non-infected
providers), they must be truly dissimilar. "For the classification to be valid the
risk of transmission to the patient would have to be unacceptably high. If the
risk of contagion were inconsequential, the equal protection clause would not
permit differentiating between HIV-infected and non-HIV-infected providers"
(Keyes 1989, 16). Having established that the chance of transmission of the
disease from HOW to patient is possible, albeit remotely so (even remotely
would be considered ‘unacceptably high’), the minimum scrutiny of rational
basis is satisfied. In the amicus brief the AMA used severity of risk, that of the
risk to third parties as one of the criteria for analysis. In this determination of
severity, with the potential for ultimate death of an individual from HIV infection,
if contracted, the potential for harm has clearly been established. While some
HOW and patient interaction will carry no greater risk than casual contact, those
who perform invasive procedures may pose a risk that is of consequence. The
COC defines invasive procedures as:
Surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major 
traumatic injuries 1) in an operating or delivery room, emergency 
department, or outpatient setting, including both physicians’ and 
dentists’ offices; 2) cardiac catheterization and angiographic
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procedures; 3) a vaginal or cesarean delivery or other invasive 
obstetric procedure during which bleeding may occur; or 4) the 
manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral tissues, 
including tooth structure, during which bleeding occurs or the 
potential for bleeding exists (COC 1987).
The focus must now shift to the "otherwise qualified" issue under the 
Rehabilitation Act. In order to effectively assess "otherwise qualified” one must 
weigh the risk posed against the benefit provided. "From the point of view of 
risk, an HIV-positive provider threatens an interest upon which society and the 
law place a high premium - life. Life-threatening behavior is unacceptable 
whenever the risk out-weighs the benefit" (Keyes 1989,22). The concern is 
raised about the best available surgeon to perform the procedure to maximize 
the potential benefit, and is this particular practitioner otherwise qualified over 
others to perform the procedure. One must use tort law to assess the risk 
balanced against the utility.
(a)While society must protect the availability of vital services, there 
is no need to protect the services of any one provider. Generally, 
there will be many non-infected providers to replace those who 
have been restricted from performing invasive procedures...
(b)restrictions due to HIV positivity will only interfere with the 
provision of a very small fraction of the total... these services can 
be adequately provided by non-infected practitioners... (c)[and] the 
extent that such interest [eliminating the likelihood and severity of 
harm] can be adequately advanced or protected by another, less 
dangerous course of action (Keyes 1989,22). “
Much of the debate about AIDS afflicted individuals has involved public fear. 
To combat this fear and to make clear law against the discrimination toward 
these individuals, the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA) was 
enacted in 1990. “  Here the definition of the handicapped individual included 
specific mention of the AIDS infected individual. While the substance of the
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definition was consistent with Sec. 504, the ADA served to remove all doubt
about the AIDS inclusion. While the Court’s decision in Ariine had defined
"significant risk" as the standard for persons with infectious diseases, the ADA
expanded the concept of the terminology with the use of the term "Direct
Threat". Title I, sec. 1630.2(r) states;
An employer may require, as a qualification standard, that an 
individual not pose a direct threat to the health and safety of 
himself/herself or others. If, however, an individual poses a direct 
threat as a result of a disability, the employer must determine 
whether a reasonable accommodation would eliminate the risk or 
reduce it to an acceptable level. If no accommodation exists that 
would either eliminate or reduce the risk, the employer may refuse 
to hire an applicant or may discharge an employee who poses a 
direct threat. The employer, however, is not permitted to deny 
employment... merely because of a slightly increased risk. The 
risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., 
high probability, of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is 
insufficient (ADA 1990). **
The wording in the ADA seems to eliminate the possibility that a remote chance
of infection by an infected HCW to a patient would be criteria sufficient for the
imposition of the concept of ‘direct threat’.
The year after the enactment of the ADA and the same year as the decision 
in Behringer, an orthopedic surgeon in Philadelphia filed suit under Title I and 
Title III of the new law. In this case the issue of risk was again placed before the 
courts after an HIV positive surgeon was placed under the same restrictions as 
were used in Behringer. Dr. Doe was first suspended by the hospital and then 
reinstated after the hospital’s medical staff concluded that Dr. Doe posed ‘no 
significant risk’ to patients. The hospital board overruled the physicians and 
applied a requirement of informed consent for all related patients as in
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Behringer. The doctor filed suit. In John Doe M.D. v. Mercy Health Corp.
(1993), the issue of direct threat v. a perceived threat was addressed. Scott 
Burris, the attorney representing Dr. Doe, argued that the if risks of 
complications, other infections as well as disclosure of surgical success are not 
being disclosed to patients, then a different standard is being applied. This 
would be in violation of the law according to Mr. Bum's (McCormack 1993, 1). “
Lawrence Gostin, executive director of the American Society of Law, 
Medicine, and Ethics, worries that the courts are setting bad precedent in these 
cases. The issues in Doe (and used in Behringei) regarding informed consent 
are “a perversion of the doctrine” according to Gostin. "Recognizable risk not 
remote risk" is the tenet of the doctrine of informed consent. “Either Dr. Doe is 
dangerous and shouldn't be allowed to practice, or he is not dangerous and his 
human rights should be respected”, says Gostin. “If the courts apply a different 
standard to physicians with HIV than they do to other disabled people, it will 
eviscerate the ADA", said Gostin (McCormack 1993,2). Gostin's point is that 
the courts have, within the healthcare setting, applied the conditions of risk to a 
higher standard. In Ariine and under Sec. 504, the standard was “significant 
risk", where the ADA sought to end the subjective angle of this terminology and 
implemented the concept of "direct threat”.
While much of the health care community remains divided on the potential for 
cross infection of the HIV virus from provider to patient, the political realties and 
the potential for accidental exposure in the course of a procedure remain. The 
studies that have currently been completed ”  still continue to show that the risk
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for acquiring HIV from an infected HCW are much less than the risk to the HCW 
from the patient. They also show that, from an epidemiological perspective, that 
the transmission potential is far less than for other infectious conditions (i.e.. 
Hepatitis B [HbV]) that have no such scrutiny and no such requirements.
Practicing health care providers are only part of the concern. What of the 
aspiring surgeon, the graduate physician who is performing surgical residency 
in order to become a full-fledged surgeon? Is there not a risk of those HIV 
positive doctors "in-training”? Would the risk be increased, both occupational 
for the physicians, and for the patient population? While much of the discussion 
up until this point has focused on the applications of the various laws that have 
followed the rights of the disabled regarding employment, the dialogue, or 
dispute, must shift to the educational area. The employment issues are 
governed under the ADA by Title I and are enforced by the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (EEOC). Under the educational aspects the 
regulations and the enforcement are different. For the purpose of this 
discussion, we will concentrate on the public education area, not because an 
argument cannot be made to include private education within the scenario, but 
merely that the lines are more clearly drawn within the public sector and that the 
private inclusion within these guidelines is not central to the issue at hand.
In addressing the educational issues regarding AIDS and the inclusion of 
these individuals as disabled, there has been national discussion since Ryan 
White’s mother first attempted enrollment of an openly HIV positive child in an 
Indiana school district. While the Ryan White case made national headlines.
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there were clear laws on the books to back up his claim to an education within a 
traditional setting. In fact, the courts have had little sympathy with school 
districts seeking to bar students from the classroom indiscriminately. Since 
1975 the inclusion of handicapped children in regular classroom activities has 
been the law. Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 
children of school age could not be excluded from participation in regular 
classroom activities due to a disability. ^  The act applies to children 5-18 years 
of age and has some inclusion of young adults under age 21 involved in post­
secondary education. The act states: "disabled children are to be integrated 
into the regular [mainstream] school program, without creating significant risks 
to students".
The act received vigorous testing in several cases and has also used Arfine 
as a basis for much of the finding. In the case of Martinez v. School Board of 
Hillsborough County, a federal district court judge ordered the placing of seven 
year old Eliana Martinez, a severely mentally handicapped child infected with 
the AIDS virus, in a “glass cage", a specially constructed room within the regular 
classroom {Martinez 1988). “  In vacating the district courts judgment in 
Martinez, the Eleventh Circuit Court cited Ariine as the authority that only 
"significant risks of transmission" will justify isolation. “Ariine is the leading 
opinion on contagious disease under the Rehabilitation Act. As such it provides 
guidelines for the treatment of AIDS issues in the public education setting" 
(Jarvis 1991). *  In the use of Ariine in making a determination in Martinez and 
others, the courts created an intricate relationship between the EAHCA and
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Sect. 504. The thought would not be lost in the subsequent creation of the ADA 
and the Title III issues relating to education.
Under the ADA many of the same issues raised in Martinez and Sect. 504 
relating to "places of public accommodation" are applicable to Title III of the 
ADA. Places of public accommodation under the ADA are numerous and 
exhaustive, but schools are clearly listed under Title III-1.2000 (10) as "places of 
education” (e.g., nursery schools, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or 
post graduate private schools). ”  As a result of the schools being considered 
places of public accommodation, then individuals with disabilities may not be 
denied "full and equal enjoyment of goods and services offered" by these 
places (lil-3.1000). Under the ADA a person may not be discriminated against 
or denied participation merely because of their disability (III-3.2000).
While the implication may be clear for participation in mainstream education 
(by mainstream I mean regular classroom, didactic education, e.g., elementary 
and secondary classroom education, and all classroom activities of a casual 
contact nature), the ADA does not demand equality of achievement. The ADA 
“does not guarantee that an individual with a disability must achieve an 
identical result or level of achievement as persons without disabilities” (III- 
3.3000). Therefore, although individuals with disabilities have the right to 
actively participate, there are clear limitations as to what must be done from 
both a reasonable accommodation standpoint and fundamental alteration of the 
nature of the goods and services being offered. According to the ADA, a 
fundamental alteration is "a modification that is so significant that it alters the
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essential nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations offered" (III-4.3600).
In light of these limitations, would an educator have to significantly alter or 
adapt "academic standards” to accommodate the disabled individual? The 
answer appears to be "no”, that this would be "unreasonable”. While a disabled 
individual is guaranteed the right to participate, he is not guaranteed the right to 
pass a particular course because of his disability. He must still meet all 
essential academic performance standards, given that the attending institution 
has made all reasonable accommodations (architectural, auxiliary aids, etc.) to 
assure a disabled individual is afforded the opportunity to pass. But what of the 
AIDS afflicted individual wishing to participate? In mainstream education the 
answer appears clear. There is not a "significant risk” to prohibit participation as 
it is determined that only casual contact exists in this classroom setting.
But this standard begs the all important question of "significant risk” in the 
education of health care workers. The education process involves the potential 
for failure and in many areas the failure process is just as essential as the 
process for success. Overcoming failure is often the application of experience, 
practical repetition and confidence, particularly in the training of performance 
skills. Health care requires many skills that can only be learned through 
intensive practical repetition and experience. In essence, one learns by doing. 
One cannot learn to perform intravenous therapy out of a book. Unless one has 
experienced the tactile feeling of a needle piercing actual tissue, one cannot 
effectively learn the procedure-at least to the standard that one would be
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allowed to actually perform the procedure on a real patient, whose very 
existence may depend on the success or failure of the skill. All the practice on 
all the rubt)er arms (a common educational tool for teaching the basics of the 
intravenous therapy procedure) in the world will not satisfy nor substitute for the 
requirement of living tissue in the educational process. One can learn the 
procedure, but not the skill without living tissue.
As has been seen in the Behringer case and in Doe, the potential "direct 
threat” to the patient has been established, regardless of the standard, but these 
are cases that involve experienced professionals already possessing clinical 
proficiency. But the issue of the health care student is unique, as no clinical 
proficiency exists. If the standards applied in the previous cases are applied to 
the student, the question arises, "can someone who is HIV positive earn a 
medical, nursing, dental, paramedic or other health care degree that involves 
‘invasive or exposure prone' procedures?”. Officials at The Medical College of 
Georgia believe that "a student in training is more likely to injure himself while 
providing treatment, and thus may pose a greater risk of transmission (of the 
HIV virus) than an experienced practitioner” (Koelbl, 1991, 235). There 
appear to be no clear laws, other than the EAHCA, regarding these students 
and the issue is left up to individual institutions for risk determination within the 
clinical performance arena.
This chapter has extensively covered the various positions of disability law 
as they pertain to the HIV positive healthcare provider. In examining the issue 
of what it means to be considered ‘otherwise qualified’ and absent of direct
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threat’, the healthcare community has a problem with a statistical reality of 
“identifiable" v. “potential” risk. As in the Sehnngrer argument, and subsequently 
in Doe, plaintiffs argued from an ambiguous position regarding this risk. The 
issues of student performance in the invasive area has been sidestepped by the 
medical community, but obviously has ominous overtones.
With the inclusion of HIV in the status of “handicapped” , the laws have 
become exhaustive as to their scope and protection. The formulation of these 
laws, and the specific Congressional testimony regarding the contents for 
inclusion will be examined in the next chapter titled, “The Framers".
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
Chapter Notes
1. Colliers Encyclopedia, (New York; Macmillan 1992), s.v. “infanticide”.
2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USC §794.
3. The term “AIDS” shall be used generically throughout as to include all 
related areas including AIDS, AIDS Related Complex {ARC}, and positive tests 
for the antibodies to the virus that causes the AIDS disease.
4. C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(1) (1987).
5. C.F.R. § 84.3(i)(2)(i) (1987).
6. School Board o f Nassau County v. Ariine (1987), 107 S. CT. 1123.
7. Ronald Tumer, “Ariine, Chalk, the Civil Rights Restoration Act, and the 
AIDS handicap”, AIDS and Public Policy Journal , 3, no. 3 (summer 1988): 2,
23.
8. Ibid, notes: See 772 F. 2d 759, 764 (11th Cir. 1984).
9. Martin H. Gerry J.D., “Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, HIV and 
AIDS: Legal Implications”, Issues in Law and Medicine, 4, no. 2, (1988): 182, 
quoting Sen. Humphrey in 134 Cong. Rec. § 256 (daily ed., Jan. 28, 1988).
10. Chalk V. United States District Court, 832 F. 2nd 1158 (9th Cir. 1987).
11. See Thomas v. Atascadero, (1987), United School D istrict, 662 F.
Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal.), and later, Honig v. Doe, (1988) 108 S. CT. 592, and 
Martinez v. School Board o f HillslDorough County, (1988) 11th Cir. 861 F. 2nd 
1502. Thomas and others were cited by the Ninth Circuit in reaching the 
decision in Chalk under the provisions of Sec. 504. Martinez while also under 
Sec. 504 also relied on the Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975 
(EAHCA). The combination of Sec. 504 and the EAHCA assured school 
children classroom attendance. Social Issues Resources Series, 2, no. 5, as 
taken from Phi Delta Kappa (Apr. 1989): 646-648.
12. Rem B. Edwards, Glenn C. Graber, Bio-Ethics, (n.p., Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich 1988): 777® Hippocratic Oath, 2, 40.
13. Estate o f WiHisun Behringer, M.D., Plaintiff, v. The Medical Center at 
Princeton, Dennis Doody, and Leund Lee, M.D. Defendants. (1991) N. J. Super, 
(Docket #L88-2250, Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division - Mercer 
County. Decided 25 Apr., 1991.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
14. Russell L. McIntyre, Th.D., Info Trends: Medicine Law and Ethics, 6, no.
4 (Summer 1991), 8.
15. New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1.
16. Gordon G. Keyes (1989), “Health Care Professional with AIDS: The 
Risk of Transmission Balanced Against the Interests of Professional and 
Institutions", Specialty Law Digest-Health Care (June 1991): 148, 19.
17. Mark Barnes, Nicholas A. Rango, Gary G. Burke, Linda Chiarello, “The 
HIV Infected Health Care Professional: Employment Policies and Public 
Health", Law, Medicine and Health Care, (Winter 1990): 18(4), 313. There 
appears to be no more current (than 1990) statistical research regarding ability 
to determine a quantifiable ‘risk' for HIV transmission from provider to patient.
18. Ibid., as quoting the CDC, Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report (Nov.
15, 1985): 34,681.
19. Ibid., 314, as quoting the AMA in “Ethical Issues Involved in the 
Growing AIDS Crisis", J. Am. Med. A. (JAMA), (March 4, 1988): 259, 1360.
20. Ibid., 314, as quoting the AMA in Statement on HIV Infected Physicians 
(Jan. 17, 1991).
21. Keyes 1989, see notes 96,19, As quoting the CDC, Morbidity &
Mortality Weekly Report (1987): 36, no. 28 at 68.
22. Keyes 1989, 22, as quoting. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
293(a)(b)(c).
23. Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), Pub. L  101-336.
24. Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), Pub. L. 101-336, 8ec.1630.2(r) 
“Direct Threat”, Appendix B, (B-28).
25. Brian McCormick, “Violation of Disabilities Act? HIV-infected doctor says 
hospital cut privileges”, American Medical News, v.36, 25 (January 1993), 1; 
see John Doe, M.D. v. Mercy Health Corp., (1993) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13347 (E.D. 
Ps 1993) no. 92-6712.
26. See C. Fordham von Reyn, et. al., “Absence of HIV Transmission from 
an Infected Orthopedic Surgeon, A Thirteen Year Lookback Study", J. Am. Med. 
A. (JAMA), (April 14,1993): 269, no. 14, 1807-1811; Audrey Smith Rogers, et. 
al., “Investigation of Potential HIV Transmission to the Patients of an HIV- 
Infected Surgeon”, J. Am. Med. A. (JAMA), (April 14, 1993): 269, no. 14, 1795- 
1801; Ban Mishu, et. al., “A Surgeon with AIDS, Lack of Evidence of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
Transmission to Patients", J. Am. Med. A. (JAMA), (July 25, 1990): 264, no. 4, 
467-470. This list is not exhaustive.
27. Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)(1975), Pub. L  
No. 94-142 89 Stat. 774, Codified @ 20 U.S.C. §1401-1461.
28. Martinez v. School Board o f Hillsborough County, (1988) 11th Cir. 861 
F. 2nd 1502.
29. Robert M. Jarvis, et. al.. Aids Law in a Nutshell, (St. Paul MN, West 
Publishing 1991).
30. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), U.S. Department of Justice, Civil 
Rights Division, Title III Technical Assistance Manual. Note: all citation from the 
ADA will be listed within the document and will be from the Title III Technical 
Assistance Manual unless otherwise noted.
31. James J., Koelbl, “AIDS at the Medical College of Georgia- A study in 
Institutional Ethics", Journal o f Dental Education (Apr. 1991) 55, no. 4, 235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4
THE FRAMERS
Where the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 fell short in the protection of the 
disabled, the Americans with Disabilities Act attempted to take up the slack.
This chapter will probe into some of the specific testimony regarding the 
formulation of this law. Experts in the field of public health argued for inclusion 
of HIV infected individuals in their fight to curb a worldwide health problem. We 
will examine the positions of the Justice Department regarding inclusion of 
‘asymptomatic’ individuals, and the reasoning for that inclusion, based on 
expected future court challenges that may arise and policy positions expressed 
by the Surgeon General.
Implementation and jurisdiction over the Americans with Disabilities Act fell 
to the U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare (later transferred to the 
Department of Health and Human Services in 1980), which issues the 
implementation regulations. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome falls under 
the Act in the physiology of the immune system which is a part of the lymphatic 
system. The Act’s covering definition will also include persons who test positive 
for the virus but who have not presented with symptoms. The inclusion of 
’asymptomatic’ individuals is a wide step away from the traditional
55
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understanding of what constitutes a disability and a clear expansion of the 
established viewpoint. The courts soon resolved this very problem.
An essential reason for the act that is not mentioned in any of the specific 
language of the law is the nation's approach to managing and mitigating or 
controlling the epidemic of Human Immunodeficiency Virus. In the Senate 
hearings, one of the key testimonies of the impact o f discrimination on the ability 
of public health officials to fight and potentially track and control the epidemic 
came from the Chairperson of the President’s Commission on the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, Admiral James Watkins. Admiral Watkins 
expressed to the committee the need for the inclusion of the AIDS afflicted 
individual on a basis that had not been addressed in previous laws that 
mandated inclusion. In Ariine and in Chalk, the issues had been about the 
individuals in the cases and had involved the discrimination that had been 
perpetrated against them. The cases had been precedent setting, but taking the 
real step of arguing that inclusion of individuals with a contagious disease in an 
anti-discrimination law would help to fight the epidemic, this was a new concept. 
Admiral Watkins, in his prepared statement before the combined House and 
Senate Committees, wrote, "HIV related discrimination is impairing this nation's 
ability to limit the spread of the epidemic.... as long as discrimination 
occurs....individuals who are infected with HIV will be reluctant to come forward
for testing, counseling, and care" (U.S. Congress, H ouse/ Senate 1988,104). ’
In Watkin’s testimony before the joint committees he described the public 
health problem:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
Crucial to this effort [to limit the spread of the epidemic] are the 
epidemiological studies to track the epidemic... . Public health officials will 
not be able to gain the confidence and cooperation of infected individuals 
or those at risk for infection if such individuals fear... discrimination based
on a positive HIV antibody test (U.S. Congress, House /  Senate 1988, 104).* 
The debate was far from over, and hearings on both sides of the capitol would 
continue.
A year later, in committee hearings before a house sub-committee, 
impassioned testimony was brought by the Rev. Scott Allen, Commissioner of 
the National Commission on AIDS out of Washington, D C. Mr. Allen, in a 
earlier statement before the same committee, agreed that, "all persons with 
symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infections should be clearly included as 
persons with disabilities" and stated that "exclusion would be a tragic mistake". 
He further argued "that subsequent acts of irrational discrimination that occur 
[toward these individuals] has been one of the unfortunate landmarks of our
Nation's response to the HIV epidemic" (U.S. Congress, House 1989, 58). * In 
his prepared statement presented to the committee, Mr. Allen stated, "people 
living with AIDS and HIV infection, and those regarded as such, deserve the 
same discrimination protections as all people with disabilities. Such protections 
from discrimination are not only necessary to enhance the quality of life for 
people, they are as the Presidential Commission and the Institute of Medicine 
have reported, the linchpin of our nations effort to control the HIV epidemic"
(U.S. Congress, House 1989, 58). *
The issue then presented to the committee was one of public health battling 
the epidemic, not just the acts of discrimination perpetrated against individuals.
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Here the actors involved have done what policy analysts call issue re-definition. 
Baumgartner and Jones have argued, generally, that this type of re-definition is 
an effort by the actors to expand the scope of conflict. Formerly, this issue had 
been seen by the American public as a homosexual problem and a problem of 
drug addicts, both undesirable components of the American population.
Several outspoken Christian ministers had even called the AIDS epidemic 
“God’s revenge on the homosexual community". To re-define the issue as a 
public health problem and not some moral evil is a tactic that solidified the 
agenda placement of the issue of AIDS and HIV, and mandated inclusion in the 
subsequent legislation. This mobilization caused the issue to be expanded 
beyond the individual concerns that had been addressed in Ariine and Chalk 
and made the public health problem a better focus to concentrate on. That did 
not stop opponents to the inclusion from expressing their views but gave real 
grounding as to the magnitude of the issues. This also allowed a partial 
dismissal of the bias associated with the view of the issue being only a
homosexual or drug abuse issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). ^
In the formulation of this new law Congress seemed to leave 'no stone 
unturned" in its search for a policy that could survive the intense courtroom 
dissection that may be in the offing. The legislature had countless hours of 
hearings from multiple committees delving into the nature of disability rights and 
issues of possible real and perceived discrimination.
In committee hearings in the House of Representatives, many persons 
testified and presented material to assist the legislature in the policy formulation
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process. Congressman William E. Dannemeyer from California questioned 
many individuals regarding the nature of the rights of the disabled and those 
proposed for inclusion in the ADA. Upon questioning Mr. Peter Addesso, a 
wheelchair-bound representative of the Paralyzed Veterans of America, Mr. 
Dannemeyer asked Mr. Addesso if "the proponents of this legislation... were 
seeking to extend the coverage of the benefits of the protection that's desired... 
for groups of people that the American public I'm not sure is willing to extend
that benefit for" (U.S. Congress, House 1989, 58). * Mr. Addesso replied, 
"Personally, I feel that we shouldn't discriminate against anybody." Mr. 
Dannemeyer continued, "What I am suggesting sir, is that I suspect that there 
may be groups seeking the coverage of this act that go far beyond what 
sensibilities and sympathies of the American public are willing to do in the way 
of accommodations for persons who have suffered genuine disabilities' (U.S.
Congress, House 1989, 58).  ^ The hearing testimony is not quoted in full; it was 
interspersed with questions about AIDS and some of the medical complications 
associated with the disorder. The point of citing it is that, irrespective of all of the 
court cases that had been litigated and judicial opinions handed down. 
Congressional opposition to an inclusion of the AIDS afflicted individual and all 
persons with communicable diseases was present. Further questioning later in 
the committee session illustrates this fact.
Mr. Chai R. Feldblum, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties 
Union, was subjected to a series of questions by Mr. Dannemeyer. Mr. 
Dannemeyer in the course of the 'interrogation', demanded 'yes' or 'no'
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answers to complex questions regarding inclusion of certain individuals in the 
proposed legislation. Mr. Dannemeyer directly asked Mr. Feldblum, "if we strike 
out the [inclusion] of persons with communicable diseases, would you still 
support the act?". Mr. Feldblum replied, after an exhausting and futile attempt to 
explain some of the intricacies of the provisions within the act, with an emphatic,
"No" (U.S. Congress, House 1989, 58). * They further discussed the issue of
"direct threat* as addressed in the CRRA by the Humphrey-Hawkins amendment
as it applies to the ADA. Here Representative Dannemeyer showed clear
ignorance of the totality of the previous laws and previous actions by Congress
itself, with regards to the CRRA and section 504. Mr. Dannemeyer stated:
... there are opportunistic diseases present in persons with HIV....that are a 
direct threat to co-workers. For this country to adopt a law that extends the 
coverage of what this act seeks to do to persons in that class is a major 
policy step... [without any] idea of the implications of what this law seeks to 
do.
Mr. Dannemeyer*s comments, on the face of it, appear uninformed and 
biased. If one were to examine a possible policy process scenario, the principle 
of charity might lead us to view them in a different light. Mr. Dannemeyer*s 
comments appear to be seeking an alternative to a possible policy that he and
his constituents find distasteful. ’  Kingdon outlines the methods that policy 
makers often rely on when faced with steps that they fear create too large a 
change. "As policy makers consider the alternatives from which they will 
choose, they repair to ideas and approaches with which they are familiar"
(Kingdon 1995, 82).
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Mr. Dannemeyer was clearly seeking an alternative to that portion of the 
policy being debated that he finds to be too far reaching (its inclusion of the 
homosexual and the drug addicted community) and inclusive of those 
unfavorable groups. The ease with which it is possible to fall back on an 
approach that is unfavorable to specific groups borders on bigotry and is a 
slippery slope that the Congressman should have wanted to avoid. With his 
specific exclusion of the homosexual and active drug abuse group members 
from the disability category, the question of group discrimination based on 
membership is brought to the forefront. Yet, as he should have known, this is 
exactly the type of discrimination that has been outlawed in the Fair Housing Act 
Amendments of 1988 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is this discrimination 
that the ADA addresses in the provision of "those regarded as having the 
disease" when the discrimination is pun/eyed to an individual based on group 
membership rather than on proof that the disability or disease actually exists. 
Unfortunately for Mr. Dannemeyer, his comments in search of a reasonable 
altemative to a policy he considered too broad and sweeping in its inclusive 
nature, appear uneducated and antiquated. It is exactly this type of thinking that 
the ADA and many of the discrimination laws are geared to fight. Mr. 
Dannemeyer may have proved the point of the whole process in a backward 
sort of way.
In the face of all the previous judicial and administrative rulings that had 
taken place prior to the start of the hearings for the ADA, it is not unreasonable 
to expect the officials in the Congress and the various departments responsible
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for the drafting of the legislation to carefully examine the precedents. This is 
what was done by the Justice Department in the form of a memorandum drafted 
by then Acting Assistant Attorney General Douglas W. Kmiec. Mr. Kmiec, in the 
memo for Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President, presented the 
views of the Justice Department on the various court rulings and administrative 
and Congressional amendments of the applicable laws.
Much of the ADA wording has been directly taken from section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, specifically the definition of what constitutes a 
disabled individual and the areas of 'otherwise qualified' and reasonable 
accommodation'. In the areas that had been less than well defined, the Justice 
Department, by way of this memo, attempted to clarify the administration's 
position regarding the inclusion of the symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV 
afflicted individual.
The Supreme Ck)urt decision in A/ilne clearly identified the symptomatic 
contagious disease carrier to be under the coverage of section 504. In fact the 
issue in Ariine had not been the nature of the affliction that caused her the 
problem and subsequent dismissal, but her risk of 'contamination' to her 
students. The court ruled clearly that "the fact that a person with a record of 
impairment is also contagious does not suffice to remove that person from 
coverage under § 504. Contagiousness by itself, does not obviate the 
existence of a handicap for purposes of section 504" (Department of Justice
1988). "
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Since the Issue of contagiousness had been resolved to the satisfaction of 
the Justice Department the issue of the asymptomatic individual, which had 
been effectively dodged by the High Court, was an issue that had to be 
addressed. Shortly after the decision in Ariine, then-Surgeon General 0.
Everett Koop informed the Justice Department, via letter, that the asymptomatic 
HIV infected individual is physically impaired, stating that "from a purely 
scientific perspective, persons with HIV infection are clearly impaired. They are 
not comparable to an immune carrier of a contagious disease such as Hepatitis
B" (Department of Justice 1988). ’*
In response to Koop's letter the Justice Department made the following 
recommendation. "In our view, the type of impairment described in the Surgeon 
General's letter fits the Health and Human Services definition of "physical 
impairment" because it is a "physiological disorder or condition" affecting the 
"hemic and lymphatic" systems. We therefore believe that, in light of the 
Surgeon General's medical assessment, asymptomatic HIV-infected 
individuals, like their symptomatic counterparts, have a physical impairment"
(Department of Justice 1988)." This is the first part of the determination for the
status of ‘handicapped’. The second and possibly more important is the effect
on 'major life activities'. One could argue that the absence of any physical
symptoms precludes inclusion under this criterion.
The question with respect to asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals is 
more difficult because such individuals would not appear at first glance to 
have disabling physical effects from their infection that substantially affect 
the type of life activities listed in the HHS regulation. ...Nevertheless, we 
believe it is likely that the courts will conclude that asymptomatic HIV-
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infected individuals have an impairment that substantially limits certain 
major life activities. ...This conclusion, we believe, may be based on the 
effect that the knowledge of infection will have on the individual or the
effect that knowledge will have on others" (Department of Justice 1988).
This distinction is essential and Kmiec makes clear a differentiation that the list
in the CFR is not to be considered an 'exhaustive' one and was of the opinion
that at least some of the courts might see certain activities that might be affected
directly by the knowledge of HIV-infection or a positive te s t.
Perhaps the most important [of] such activities are procreation and 
intimate personal relations. Based on the medical knowledge 
available...the life activity of procreation ...is substantially limited for an 
asymptomatic HIV-infected individual...[and] because of the infection... 
they will be unable to fulfill this basic human desire" (Department of
Justice 1988). "
Kmiec continued a discussion of the 'intimate relations'. "The life activity of 
engaging in sexual relations is threatened and probably substantially limited by
the contagiousness of the virus" (Department of Justice 1988). *
This outlines the Department's opinion on how the knowledge of the 
presence of the infection affects the carrier. But how does the knowledge of the 
infection affect the reactions of others? This will involve the section of the 
definition of 'handicapped' which states that an "individual [may be] regarded as
having such an impairment" (CFR 1987). "
The problem with the "regarded as having an impairment" element of the 
statute is that much of the issue involves one person's perception of another.
Due to continued prejudice against infected individuals and individuals who are 
members of groups with an abnormally high risk for the infection, the need to 
expand the definition to be inclusive of these individuals was apparent to the
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Justice Department. Reactions of others to the knowledge of the presence of an 
HIV-infected individual have ranged from mild displeasure to outright hysteria. 
Reference the Ryan White school attendance issue and the family of three HIV- 
infected boys who were burned out of their home because of community fear 
and ignorance. While these cases made national headlines and were 
ultimately decided on issues other than disability law. community reaction is 
often one based on an unfounded fear that has been used to discriminate
against individuals so afflicted (EAHCA, 1975). "
This reaction was not out of the scope of the Justice Department’s concern. 
The decision in Arf/ne gave clear perspective that the handicapped definition 
includes someone who is regarded by others as having a limitation of major life 
activities, whether they do or not. The literal reference is to actual infected 
individuals who do not show any outward signs and not to the mis-perception of 
disability based on prejudice. This literal interpretation is precisely the issue 
that Representative Dannemeyer was addressing when questioning Mr. 
Addesso. If an individual is being discriminated against because of a perceived 
infection, does he fall under the protection of the ADA? Does this mean, as 
Representative Dannemeyer asserted, that members of high risk groups m aybe 
included under the handicapped criterion, if the 'perceived infection’ was the 
reason for the discrimination? The answer appears to be 'yes’, even though 
mere membership in a high risk group itself is not a cause for inclusion. This is 
an issue that will ultimately be decided in the courtroom as no precedent exists 
on this issue. The Supreme Court has stated that the coverage of §504 does
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include persons "who as a result [of being incorrectly regarded as handicapped]
are substantially lim ited in a major life activity" {Davis 442 US 397, 1979). "
The effect of this interpretation is that the perceived impairment need not 
directly result in a limitation of a major life activity, so long as it has the indirect 
effect, due to the mis-perception of others, of limiting a life activity." That is, the 
law must not sanction exclusion based on mis-perception.
In Ariine, the perception of a physical disability by others "does not have to 
include the belief that the perceived condition results in a limitation of major life 
activities, but simply that the perception of the condition by others in itself has
that effect" (Department of Justice 1988).*° It is clear (as clear as fog can be) 
that this might be used as a possible argument if an individual, by virtue of 
membership in a high risk group, were perceived to be infectious, thereby 
having a major life activity limited, would be so covered under the provisions of 
the ADA. There would have to be a clear case that the individual was not 
claiming coverage as a member of the high risk group and had a prima facie 
case of discrimination based on the perception of others. The issue of the 
discrimination against these individuals does not go without limitation. This was 
addressed by the court in Ariine with the "otherwise qualified" wording, and in 
the Humphrey /  Harkin amendment of "direct threat" in the CRRA, later 
incorporated into §504.
In the areas of "otherwise qualified" and "direct threat", the framers of the 
legislation were careful to make allowances for the afflicted in the first case and 
protection of others in the second. While the concept of "otherwise qualified"
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was used in the decision in Ariine and is a standard in the determination of the
qualifying of the disabled, it is often coupled with the "reasonable
accommodation" caveat that also accompanies "direct threat". Since the
wording in the laws, of both §504 and the ADA, remain unchanged with regards
to "otherwise qualified”, we will eliminate that wording from the discussion as
the framers saw no reason to change or alter the treatment of this section.
Since the Harkin /  Humphrey amendment to the CRRA (later incorporated into
§504), the concept of "direct threat" and "reasonable accommodation" were
included in the debates on capitol hill. In the Kmiec memo, the Justice
Department outlined the basic tenet of the "direct threat" component and
specifically addresses the AIDS issue.
[A] person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious 
disease to others... will not be considered otherwise qualified ... if 
reasonable accommodation will not eliminate the risk. Persons infected 
with the AIDS virus will not be otherwise qualified to perform jobs that 
involve significant risk of transmitting the virus to others (Department of
Justice 1988). ^
The risk of viral transmission can be obviated by making reasonable 
accommodation to eliminate the risk, but the Justice Department, in the Kmiec 
memo, stated there might be cases where there may be a justification for 
treating the HIV-infected individual differently than non-infected individuals.
This appears to be done on a case by case basis with the determination of 
'otherwise qualified' and ‘direct threat’ applied to each scenario. Persons found 
otherwise qualified (in general) but unable to eliminate the direct threat to 
others would be considered not ‘otherwise qualified’. The language is very 
specific in this memo. Kmiec wrote:
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Courts may find in certain specialized contexts that an HIV-infected 
individual is not otherwise qualified at any stage of the disease because 
infection in itself presents an especially serious health or safety risk to
others because of the nature of the position (Department of Justice 1988).
The need to place the responsibility on a case by case basis was the 
framer’s attempt to not violate any provision of the Acts themselves, but to also 
subject the inquiry to the equal protection requirements in the 14th Amendment. 
The Justice Department outlined several areas where an infected individual 
may not be otherwise qualified. Depending on the stage of the disease, those 
responsible for public safety such as air traffic controllers or pilots, policemen or 
bus drivers, may not be covered. The outlined areas also specifically mention 
surgeons in teaching hospitals that may have surgical privileges restricted or t)e 
prohibited from performing invasive procedures. The Justice Department 
specifically stated: "it may not be possible to make reasonable accommodation 
... where the risk of injury is great". Kmiec concludes the discussion with a re­
statement of the provisions of §504 and the concept of direct threat.
The proponents of the ADA were seeking to codify existing laws as they 
pertained to the handicapped. They were also seeking to further define and re­
define existing language as it pertains to contagious disease and risk imposed 
on the public by the existence of these diseases. The ADA could be called a 
"garbage can” law. It involves so many existing laws and statutes that it really 
seeks to pull all of the decisions into one area.
One of the big problems associated with the ADA is its far reaching 
application that is left for the courts to sort out. The framers, in the drafting of the 
act, clearly did not know what all of the implications may be, because the
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science related to these infectious conditions lags behind the public necessity 
for action. Representative Dannemeyer, in his opposition to the amendment of 
the CRRA may be entirely correct when he stated: "If this bill is passed, as 
presently written, employers will be required to accommodate victims of this
23
fatal disease despite potential health threats to other employees."
Realistically, the Congressman's comment is probably not in-step with the 
science, but so much is still unknown about the virus that many are unwilling to 
discount the possibility that he could be correct, and the nation has set itself up 
for a major public health problem. The Congressman believes that the act is a 
leap of faith that should not be made in haste.
The unique aspect found in this inquiry was the ability of the representatives 
of the various agencies to transform the item from a homosexual and drug 
abuse disease into a public health fighting tool. This issue re-definement is an 
essential component of the act and Admiral Watkins’ testimony before the joint 
House and Senate committees is the most profound element discovered so far.
It is clearly plausible, as referenced in the Admiral’s comments and prepared 
statement, that any discrimination against HIV-infected individuals would force 
the virus, and those infected with it, to go underground. This would cause the 
ability of the public health agencies to track, report, and fight the "unseen 
enemy", to virtually disappear overnight.
This has been the case from the very beginning. The AIDS virus, due to its 
deadly nature and method of transmission, has caused heightened concern 
among the population. Those afflicted by the disease, whether symptomatic or
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asymptomatic, have been reluctant to seek treatment and counseling for fear of 
societal reprisals and discrimination. This above-board treatment of the afflicted 
individual, within the confines of the provisions of the ADA, can only seek to 
relieve the burden of secrecy that has so plagued these individuals.
As we have examined in this chapter, exhaustive testimony and clarification 
has been sought by the various framers o f this law. We have seen the 
reluctance, by individuals and agencies, to place within the law any portion that 
would extend disability protection to undeserving persons. We have also seen 
the strength of the medical argument, as referenced by the comments of the 
Surgeon General to the Justice Department for inclusion. Clear interpretation 
by the Justice Department has also supported the exclusion of individuals who 
have been determined to not be ‘otherwise qualified' because of their inability 
to show they are absent of ‘direct threat*. Congressional testimony aside, the 
re-definement of the issue into a public health crisis helped solidify the 
circumscription of asymptomatic individuals afflicted with HIV within the confines 
of disability law.
The following chapter will outline a plausible policy designed to address 
concerns raised by the Framers of these complicated laws and to offer 
alternatives to existing policy and procedures that are fair and just to all.
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CHAPTER 5 
POUCY
In proposing any new policy for a stated problem, a clear and concise reason 
must be given to justify the change. As the previous chapters have outlined, we 
are faced with a continued public health issue that will not go away. The 
previous chapters have shown the issues that have become problematic as a 
result of current practices. This chapter will examine some of the flaws that 
current practices and policies have allowed and will propose a plausible 
alternative policy that is workable under current disability laws. The public 
grows weary with continued protective legislation that ignores the concerns of 
the general well-being in favor of select individuals and groups. Protection from 
discrimination is very important and must never be ignored. But when the 
protection, reasonable or not, infringes on the health and welfare of the 
community as a whole, real common good and autonomy is lost.
Personal autonomy, privacy, and professional growth are central to the 
philosophical, legal, ethical, and policy positions of professional associations 
responding to the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. Current policies are 
clear in many aspects but ambiguous in others. The apparent goal of the 
associations is to outline a standard of conduct consistent with available
73
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
scientific information and to offer their members a format of performsunce relative 
to their patients, their practices, and themselves.
Professional associations have traditionally asserted that they are the best 
guardians of their own affairs as no one else is capable of fairly judging elite 
professionals other than their own peer groups. It is said that the general 
public, and those outside the particular area of expertise, do not have enough 
knowledge to fairly arbitrate that which they do not fully understand. This claim 
has been asserted in many areas including medicine, law, and some of the 
public sector including police agencies. While the "public lacks knowledge” 
claim is effective in many areas, it has also been equated with "hiring the fox to 
watch the hen house". Professional groups and associations have knowledge 
and they have an inherent obligation to protect association members from harm, 
real and perceived. This obligation cannot be taken lightly but it also can be 
disguised to the general public by the use of scientific data, flowery verbiage, 
and technical language designed to lose anyone but the most learned 
professional colleague. Hence, public respect for self-governing professionals 
can deteriorate.
This criticism of professional associations and their policy analysts may be 
too strong and bordering on the unfair. We would like to believe that these 
associations are aware of their moral obligation to act in the best interests of the 
public at large. But the argument is designed to show that there may be some 
flaws in the peer review process and that sometimes the process itself should 
be questioned. Clear policy from professional associations would give their
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members guidelines on which to base their behavior and build public 
confidence in a health care system which has been accused of being elitist and 
unresponsive to public fears and concerns about safety. The issue is not 
whether the public fears and concerns are justified, merely that the system has 
been unresponsive to the public perception that the health care community has 
placed the rights and needs of its members above those of the patients and the 
public.
Professional associations, specifically the American Medical Association 
(hereinafter AMA) and the American Dental Association have developed 
policies and standards of conduct for their members that try to balance the 
professional obligations of their memberships in performance against the rights 
of their members to be treated as equal citizens relative to personal rights and 
freedoms. This has been a difficult task. This delicate balance has come under 
fire for not taking into consideration moral obligations of these professional 
groups that are central to their own philosophical basis.
The AMA’s ethics policy. Principles of Medical Ethics (1980), guides its 
members' ethical responsibilities. The policy states that physicians must 
recognize their obligations, not only to the patients, but also to society at large.
It does not state that physicians must "keep their patients from harm" as stated in 
the Hippocratic Oath, but speaks of medical competence, compassion, and 
human dignity. Statements in defense of the 4th century, bce oath of 
Hippocrates would be inappropriate as much has changed within the current 
scope of medical practice and the relationship of physician and patient is
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dramatically different in the modern era. The principles of this ethics policy 
outline acceptable actions for physicians. They are charged with honest 
dealings with patients and colleagues, respect for patient rights, advancement 
of scientific knowledge, making relevant information available to patients, and 
using the talents of other health professionals when indicated (Mappes and 
Zembaty 1986, 54-55). ' Basic medical ethics are essential for professional 
conduct and it appears in the policy that obligations of the medical practitioner 
are clear regarding patient rights. The controversy comes in the application of 
the principles, the interpretation of the obligations, and the extent to which these 
obligations are applicable.
On the issues of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and HIV infection, 
professional associations have a problem relative to their members and their 
professional conduct. On the one hand, physicians are charged with providing 
care and minimizing risks, on the other hand they must respect the rights of their 
own group as individuals. Since the identification of the HIV virus in 1985, 
scientific information has been compiled about methods of transmission of the 
virus from host to recipient. While the complete epidemiological profile for 
transmission is not relevant to the discussion at hand, the blood to blood 
transmission has implications for the medical community both as an 
occupational risk for the healthcare worker (often abbreviated HCW) in dealing 
with the infected patient, and as patient safety from the infected healthcare 
worker. *
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The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has defined the risk of exposure for
patients to involve only invasive procedures {MMWR ^99^, 40 [No. RR-8], 1-9) ®
and that all other care of a non-invasive nature poses no risk of transmission of
HIV or HbV (Hepatitis B virus) to the patient. The term ‘invasive’ has proved
unworkable as it appears that only certain invasive procedures of a surgical and
dental nature have been implicated in transmission of HbV. These and other
invasive procedures have been redefined as "exposure-prone" and the CDC
states that "performance of exposure-prone procedures presents a recognized
risk of percutaneous injury to the HCW, and - if such an injury occurs - the
HCW's blood is likely to contact the patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues.
and/or mucous membranes" (JAMA August 14,1991, 774-775). * The CDC also
states that "HCWs who adhere to universal precautions pose a small risk for
transmitting HbV to patients". ® They further state that "HIV is transmitted much
less readily than HbV" {JAMA August 14, 1991, 771). They conclude:
Investigations of HIV and HbV transmission from HCWs to patients 
indicate that, when the HCWs adhere to recommended infection-control 
procedures (universal precautions), the risk of transmitting HbV from an 
infected HCW to a patient is small, and the risk of transmitting HIV is likely to 
be even smaller {JAMA August 14,1991, 775). ®
While the CDC has defined the term ‘exposure-prone procedures',
identification of which procedures are exposure-prone was sidestepped. They
state that "exposure-prone procedures should be identified by
medical/surgical/dental organizations and institutions at which the procedures
are performed." They further state that there is "no basis for recommendations
to restrict the practice of HCWs infected with HIV or HbV who perform invasive
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procedures not identified as exposure-prone”. This policy stance by the CDC
places the weight of the problem directly on the professional organizations. The
CDC's reluctance to take a stand on which procedures should be deemed
exposure-prone placed the associations in a position such that may have far
reaching implications to their members. In the strongest position yet taken, the
CDC recommends that,
HCWs who are infected with HIV or HbV... should not perform exposure- 
prone procedures unless they have sought counsel from an expert review 
panel and have been advised under which circumstances, if any, they may 
continue to perform these procedures.... Such circumstances would include 
notifying prospective patients of the HCW’s seropositivity before undergoing 
exposure-prone procedures {JAMA August 14, 1991, 775).
The CDC also states that if professional practices of infected HCWs are 
modified or restricted, appropriate retraining and career counseling should be 
encouraged to promote continued use of the HCW s skills. This policy position, 
while workable in theory, has not been feasible in the practical sense. In the 
Behringer court case, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld an institution's 
right to restrict surgical privileges of an HIV infected surgeon by requiring the 
surgeon to get informed consent from patients about his seropositivity prior to 
surgery. ® This would seem consistent with the CDC recommendations but may 
conflict with subsequent legislation regarding disability rights as outlined in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the term Direct Threat’ (Americans with 
Disabilities Act [ADA], 1990).
The determination of risk and what constitutes identifiable risk, significant 
risk, and acceptable risk, has not gone without debate, both in medicine and 
business. Deborah A. Stone, in her work Policy Paradox and Political Reason. ®
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discusses the concept o f security. "In many current policy debates, people are 
said to have needs based on the condition of 'being at risk’.” This risk is for a 
"potential harm" or harm that has not yet happened and exists only in the future. 
She states that "future needs often have a political potency far greater than 
actual needs.” She further argues that the human imagination is capable of 
creating strong emotional terror and fervent arguments seeking protection and 
safety even in the face of statistics that do not support the needs (Stone 1988, 
77). Stone also determines that risk is calculated if the potential harms are 
predictable and that the "probabilistic association of harmful outcomes with 
human actions is widely accepted as a demonstration of cause-and effect 
relationship” (Stone 1988, 156).
In other words, real predictable harm such as the death of a patient during or 
after surgery, even for events that may have no statistical basis on an individual 
case, may constitute an identifiable risk. These identifiable risks are exactly the 
type of risks that are disclosed to patients and discussed with them prior to the 
commencement of any surgery. While the risks are different for each and every 
procedure, all procedures carry some amount of risk that the physician 
discusses with the patient. This is called informed consent. Here the physician 
informs the patient of the identifiable risks and tries to balance them against the 
rewards that the necessary (or elective as the case may be) procedure will 
provide. In many cases the risks are deemed negligible, or if real and possible, 
may not involve a real risk of patient demise. Some risks may be real and 
patient survival may be at stake and these can be either side of the spectrum.
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having or not having the procedure. Regardless of the extent of the probability, 
or on which side of the position one stands, it is the patient that must ultimately 
make the decision to accept the risks and have the procedure performed, or to 
not accept the risks and choose a different provider, or live or die with the 
consequences. In all instances a prudent person will seek to reduce his risk of 
mortality while achieving the maximum benefit available. We wear seat belts to 
reduce risk, we look both ways before crossing the street, we comply with 
prescribed medications to get healthy and reduce mortality. All constitute our 
ability to reduce risk by prudent and calculated actions. We are, or try to be, 
fully informed of the consequences of inaction and take steps to avoid exposure 
and thereby diminish risk.
On the subject of risk, the AMA has adopted a set of terms that are used 
within their membership and in their association policies. In response to the 
HIV and HbV transmission concerns of the patient population, the AMA has 
replaced the term 'identifiable risk" with that of 'significant risk* and states that "a 
risk is significant if it is real and would change the actions of a reasonable 
person." "There must be demonstrated risk of transmission, along with some 
impact on decisions from knowledge of transmission probability, to meet the 
standard of 'significant risk'" (AMA 1992, 91). " Due to a lack of documented 
cases of transmission from physician to patient at this time, the AMA states that 
this "transmission cannot, in general, be said to present a significant risk." This 
is somewhat clear in what the CDC has stated earlier that the risk is lower than 
HbV transmission, but nowhere do any of the associations say that the risk is
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zero or statistically zero. In the transmission statistics for HbV. studying multiple 
patient infection groups, even with modification of the practiced universal 
precautions (i.e.. double gloves, restriction of high risk procedures), certain HbV 
transmissions still occurred even though they were limited in scope. The CDC 
states, "however, the limited number of recent reports does not preclude the 
occurrence... of transmission [and] routine use of gloves does not prevent most 
injuries caused by sharp instruments and does not eliminate the potential for 
exposure of a patient to a HCW s blood and transmission of HbV” {JAMA August 
14,1991, 774, quoting the CDC). This assertion is that the risk of transmission 
of HbV cannot be eliminated by routine universal precautions and modified 
precautions. Then by using the CDC’s 'small risk* terminology for HbV and the 
'much less' (than HbV) term fo r HIV, indicates that the ambiguous language 
makes the scientific information currently available indeterminate at best.
The AMA offers this statement on transmission and patient rights In their
policy compendium;
Physicians, other health care providers and patients must recognize their 
personal responsibility to prevent transmission of HIV disease in all 
situations.... When the scientific data are unclear, it is mandatory that the 
rights of the patient take precedence over those of the physician. In all 
instances, physicians strive to "do no harm" to patients (AMA 1992, 91).
AMA policies do not identify which procedures are exposure-prone. Neither 
does the American Dental Association. In one assertion the AMA states that the 
risk of HIV transmission is immeasurably low (transmission risk as determined 
by the American Dental Association is listed as "infinitesimal"), and much less 
than HbV, yet in policy they call for voluntary compliance for seropositivity
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determination and offer a policy for monitoring of HIV-infected physicians
(American Dental Association 1991, 21). The policy offers two reasons for
monitoring: First, "to control the use of procedures with a significant risk of HIV
transmission to patients* and second, to "maintain a high standard of practice of
infection control". They further state:
Any HIV-infected physician should disclose his/her serostatus to a local 
review committee. ...This review committee may restrict the physician’s 
practice, if they believe there is a significant risk to patients’ welfare. One 
such restriction may be the disclosure of physician seropositivity to 
patients and obtaining consent prior to a procedure deemed to pose a 
significant risk (AMA 1992, 94).
This statem ent, in light of the previous assertions that the risk o f HIV
transmission was remote at best, appear to be a contradiction in the
association's policies. Either there is a significant risk of transmission during
certain procedures or there is not. They do state within the policy that "this risk
is only theoretical in that no such transmission has so far been documented",
but this statement does not relieve the contradiction. The contradiction is not
present in the Current Policies of the American Dental Association. The dental
community has long advocated universal precautions for the prevention of
disease transmission and address the issue of HIV positive practitioners. They
state:
HIV infection alone does not justify the limiting of professional duties, or 
automatically mandate disclosure, unless the dental health care worker 
poses a risk of transmitting infection through non-compliance with 
universal precautions, [or] a lack of infection control competence...
(American Dental Association 1991, 21).
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The American Dental Association also advocates peer review for compliance
with the listed items and also recommends voluntary compliance with
seropositivity determination, but the policy, on the face of i t , appears consistent.
The whole problem with the risk management policies of the professional
associations is that we are forced to choose which course of action is
acceptable; either one that uses such vague terms as "infinitésimal" and
"remote at best" to describe the risk of transmission; or one that will side with
caution, prudence, and the public interest. "Errors are inevitable in such cases,
and contemporary philosophy of logic and applied mathematics has no
alternative available to a conscientious person under these conditions. The
uncertainty cannot be hidden or ignored, one of (the) two kinds of errors will be
committed" (Walton 1998). "
Dr. Craig Walton, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Institute for
Ethics and Policy Studies at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, argued in a
recent paper the dangers of the DoE proposal on deep geological burial of
high-level at Yucca Mountain, NV, that there are two types of uncertainty
calculi: Type I (scientifically conservative) and Type II (morally conservative)
errors. Dr. Walton states:
Type I errors involve saying, in effect, “if we must admit some errors into our 
scientific base, let us prefer to reject a true hypothesis not yet actually 
confirmed [here, that there is some risk to patients with HIV positive HCWs 
performing ‘exposure prone' procedures], rather than accept a false 
hypothesis, not yet actually falsified" [that the risk is not relevant because no 
patients have been infected]. (Walton 1998).
Here the physician community would have us accept that it is better science to
allow infected providers to continue to practice because the patients have "not
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yet" been infected, rather than eliminate the risk because it is only “remotely”
possible. Walton continues concerning Type II errors:
Type II errors, by contrast, involve saying, in effect: if we must admit some 
errors into our science, let us prefer to include an hypothesis not yet 
confirmed, because of the meaning it has for public health and safety, 
rather than excluding it because we are not able to prove a high likelihood 
that it will in fact happen" (Walton 1998).
What Dr. Walton is saying is that we should never take a policy position based
on something that is possibly false (but not yet falsified) in the face of something
that is possibly true (but not corroborated). Walton sums it up best when he
stated:
Type II logic is chosen when the public health and safety is at risk...if error 
is likely... than we err on the side of caution rather than... saying, “that 
danger has not been proven to be highly likely, so we can ignore it".
(Walton 1998).
When the issues of risk management deal with a given amount of uncertainty 
and probability cannot establish clear parameters upon which to base policy 
decisions; then prudence of action is the best response. Since we must choose 
one of these two approaches (Type I or Type II) it is the latter that offers the most 
cautious and prudent course of action.
The question now arises, "is the public willing to accept these risks or 
increase in risk, or not?" If we are unable to accept this increase in risk and 
prefer to mandate patient rights and full disclosure in the format of informed 
consent, what is the impact on the polis as a whole? If we mandate patient 
rights over that of the disabled individual, do we impinge on the rights of the 
infected person?
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The problems of identifying select members o f groups as outlined in
association policies without taking a discriminatory stance are challenging at
best, but from a solution standpoint they appear defensible. Handicapped
regulations as outlined in the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 do not permit this dissimilar treatment if the person can show that they are
"otherwise qualified*. There are several criteria used to satisfy the "otherwise
qualified* standing but if the afflicted individual cannot get past the concept of
"direct threat" then they cannot prove that they are otherwise qualified. The
ADA expanded the concept of the terminology; which states:
An employer may require, as a qualification standard, that an individual not 
pose a direct threat to the health and safety o f himself/herself or others. If, 
however, an individual poses a direct threat as a result of a disability, the 
employer must determine whether a reasonable accommodation would 
eliminate the risk or reduce it to an acceptable level. If no accommodation 
exists that would either eliminate or reduce the risk, the employer may 
refuse to hire an applicant or may discharge an employee who poses a 
direct threat. The employer, however, is not permitted to deny employment 
... merely because of a slightly increased risk. The risk can only be 
considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability, of 
substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient (ADA 1990).
The wording In the ADA seems to eliminate the possibility that a remote
chance of infection by an infected HCW to a patient would be criteria enough for
the imposition of the concept of ‘direct threat’. Court cases such as Behringer
and Doe seem to prove, or least affirm, that the concept of direct threat would
include surgical intervention. On the issue of the policy conditions regarding
the plaintiffs right to practice surgery the Behringer Court took a stand that has
been a hallmark for the position on health care providers who perform
exposure-prone procedures. The Court used many pieces of information in
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formulating its decision. It was determined that surgeons (and dental 
practitioners) frequently injure their fingers in the course of providing treatment. 
“Most injuries are minor, but severe and unusual injuries sometimes do occur" 
and surgical glove cuts and cuts to the fingers, while not commonplace, were 
not unheard of (Keyes 1989,19). In fact, these events do appear to be 
commonplace. In a three month study at a Connecticut hospital of operating 
room personnel cataloguing breaks in infection control procedures and 
universal precautions, there were a reported 331 instances. Of these 331, 70 
(21%) were from sharp injuries that caused direct pain to the individual. We 
must remember that these statistics are from a single hospital and only over a 
three month period. Even with the principle of charity and the assumption that 
they 'had a bad three months', the significance cannot be overstated. If we 
were to reduce the numbers by 90%, taken against the whole of the nation, in 
ALL of the hospitals and operating rooms (and these were only statistics 
generated within the surgical environment, not including other areas that may 
have some invasive performances, i.e. emergency rooms) the numbers are at 
least significant and alarming at the worst (Wright, et. al. 1991 ).
Norman Daniels, a philosophy professor at Tufts University, argues that the 
benefits of identifying and subsequently removing or restricting the practices of 
infected providers will in no way justify the costs involved. Dr. Daniels, in what 
appears to be a standard cost-benefit analysis, argues that the costs are not 
only monetary but societal as well. The cost of 'switching* or the act of changing 
practitioners due to HIV status affords a cost that is prohibitively high for all. The
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switching creates the need to identify the afflicted individuals when the costs of 
the identification are prohibitive from a monetary standpoint at best. This 
causes money that may have been better spent elsewhere (i.e. education, 
improving compliance with infection control measures, research, and 
monitoring) to be allocated to the discovery of infected practitioners. This is a 
long term cost that Daniels says we should be unwilling to pay as the costs do 
not outweigh the benefits (Daniels 1992, 1368-1371). Daniels also states that 
the costs would also be reflected in an increase in the discrimination against 
AIDS patients because of the occupational risk inherent to HCWs. If physicians 
were to face loss of their livelihood because of occupational seropositivity, they 
would be less likely to want to treat AIDS afflicted patients.
Daniels makes an excellent argument in support of this concept and this 
occupational risk alone is worthy of debate. His concept of using a statistical 
analysis for surgical proficiency as opposed to seropositivity (designed to 
eliminate the less skilled surgeon based on mortality and surgical success) is 
also valuable.
But overall, I disagree and I think Daniels refutes his own argument when 
he discusses the costs of fear. Dr. Daniels wants to keep the discussion within 
a framework that is purely objective in nature and to dismiss the subjective 
concepts of patient rights on a limited scale. "It is only because employers or 
other workers try to hide behind their subjective views of risk in order to deny 
equality of opportunity to handicapped workers that we must insist on objective 
assessments of risk* (Daniels 1992,1370).
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Fear and stress are recognized problems within the medical community, 
often cited as causing patient illness and exacerbating existing conditions. A 
patient switching from an infected surgeon to a non-infected one may achieve 
no measurable benefit except to alleviate his or her own fear. This fear may be 
exaggerated by prejudice and stigma, but the costs of living with this fear may 
be more than the switching. It may be a rational risk-benefit analysis that the 
patient has examined, even when we tend to ignore comparable risks in other 
contexts (Daniels 1992, 1389). I think that Dr. Daniels also neglects, when 
discussing risk, that in any situation where mortality exists I will seek to reduce 
my risk by contemplating alternative actions. I reduce my risk in the automobile 
by wearing a seat belt. I wear a helmet when bicycling. If, in any situation, I can 
reduce my mortality, even only fractionally, then through the process of 
deliberation, I can reduce my risk, or choose not to. The resultant amount of 
tolerated risk then becomes a personal choice and is not based on a statistical 
analysis. The resultant costs of fear become the price that we are not willing to 
pay.
It is difficult to take a position that appears discriminatory, alarmist, and 
paranoid. It is also difficult to argue against the scientific information and 
statistics that seek to prove that the “real risks” of infection transmission are 
extremely low. Above these issues, there appears to be universal agreement 
that research efforts and money should be allocated to increase the ability of the 
medical community to combat infection transmission from an occupational 
exposure, and I agree. This can help, not only from the occupational end but
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also from the patient protection angle. The medical community must also 
explore the possibility o f re-inventing some of the accepted surgical techniques 
to relieve the surgeon’s risk from being too close to instruments that may cause 
percutaneous injury to the surgeon. Until that becomes a readily acceptable 
alternative, exposure-prone procedures will not diminish in risk and the need for 
further actions will be indispensable.
Immediate action is necessary to restore public confidence. The medical 
community must collaborate, debate, and decide which procedures are 
'exposure-prone'. W ithout the medical and professional associations 
participation the legislators can have no clear framework from which to proceed. 
In the absence of a definition of ‘exposure prone', the less accurate term of 
‘invasive procedures' should be employed and the legislative branches should 
act to enforce mandatory testing. Alternatively, if the medical community can 
identify exposure prone procedures, then only those physicians who wish to 
participate in these procedures will need to be monitored. Monitoring tactics 
should include HIV seronegativity results to be submitted with license 
renewals.’* This should be monitored on the national level, preferably by the 
CDC, and a central data base should be compiled. The CDC is the natural 
choice since they already track the virus. This would eliminate the problems 
with state to state reciprocity and repetitive efforts of tracking and testing. 
Complete participation by the medical professional is the only way we can 
assure fair treatment for all parties concerned.
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While one might object that submission with license renewal will not identify 
all infected individuals due to the serologic time window for infection to become 
identifiable on lab results, I counter with the positive results of elimination of 
currently infected individuals, proactive self-monitoring by the surgical 
community, and ultimate catch-up with the séroconversions that happen in the 
interim.
Another objection might accuse me of taking a stance that is truly 
discriminatory against defined handicapped individuals, - which would be 
against the law. As I have shown by the application of common law (as in 
Behringer), however, these individuals cannot show they are otherwise 
qualified’ and absent of ‘direct threat’. If they are not otherwise qualified’, it is 
not discrimination.
I also argue that my approach, while dependent on the action of the 
professional associations, is not in and of itself discriminatory. I do not argue 
mandatory testing. A physician only has to submit lab results if wishing to 
perform exposure-prone procedures. Those who do not wish to submit results 
may move into areas of clinical practice that do not involve these procedures, 
thereby avoiding diminishing their ability to earn a living. Those who submit lab 
results that are positive and still seek to participate in these procedures will be 
mandated to obtain informed consent from their patients. Disability insurance 
and other monetary protections for physicians that seroconvert from 
occupational hazard should be afforded to all those practicing in the operating 
theater, as the occupational hazards are real and should not be understated.
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As the physician community continues to argue for increased protections 
from occupational exposure, an additional possibility could be offered.
As more and more seropositivity from the surgical community comes to the 
forefront, a 'bank* of HIV seropositive surgeons may be created to achieve a 
decrease in occupational exposure for the non-infected. When circumstances 
and time allows, the ‘AIDS surgeon* could be brought in to perform exposure- 
prone procedures on patients that are identified as HIV positive. With growing 
numbers of the general population becoming HIV seropositive, this may be a 
long term solution that may help relieve some of the occupational concerns. 
These ‘banks’ could be regionally located so access to the patients would not 
be inordinately delayed.
An objection might be raised that this approach further “isolates" the disabled 
and HIV positive community. This is not my intent. I argue for the concept of 
AIDS surgeons’ from a purely practical and protective angle. If HIV positive 
surgeons can assist their colleagues and reduce the risks of further 
seropositivity from occupational exposures by performing the exposure prone 
procedures, then the general risk of further infection has been diminished. The 
goal of any public health pandemic program is to stop the spread of infection. 
This objective can only further help to stem the tide of an overwhelming 
situation.
This entire policy position should also be recognized as not being limited in 
scope. The entire argument may be further expanded to include other health 
care practitioners involved in ‘exposure prone’ procedures such as surgical
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technicians and operating room nurses. It is also not limited by the specific viral 
agent. It may be expanded to include those individuals that are HbV positive as 
well, since HbV has been clearly shown to be more virulent than HIV. The 
medical community has traditionally taken the leadership role in matters of 
patient autonomy, safety, and public education. An active, positive approach 
from the scientific community, seeking alternatives that are workable and clearly 
definable is needed, now.
The moral defense for the aforementioned policy w ill follow in the next two 
chapters. The ethical conduct and responsibility of these healthcare 
practitioners is central to the justification for making a change. When the 
statistical relevance of the scientific information has been brought into question, 
the ethical platform is much firm er ground upon which to stand.
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CHAPTER 6
Communitarian Justification
The concept o f a community of people, banded together to enforce rights and
obligations, is not a contemporary theme. Aristotle, in the first line of his work
The Politics. ’ states that: “Every state is a community of some kind, and every
community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in
order to obtain that which they think is good" (POL. 1252 a I -1254). This
chapter shall discuss the issues of the greater community and its good
balanced against the individual needs that may arise within it. We will discuss
individual responsibility as related to the community as a whole and the rights of
that community regarding its members and their responsibilities.
The sense of community is what binds people together in search of the
common good based on their views of what that good may be. It is a principle
ascribing to all humankind a vested interest in one another’s moral, intellectual,
and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his or
her own standards (Feinberg 1986, 215). '  Hobbes discusses the concept of
community, or to use Hobbes’s term, commonwealth, at great length in
Leviathan. = As a result of man's formation of the commonwealth, the power
behind the individual in the enforcement of the natural rights and civil rights (the
covenants, or agreements among men) are made possible. The defense of the
95
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natural rights is easier in a group. When a man is attacked and his life is in 
jeopardy, is it not easier to defend one’s life with the help o f others? People 
bind together in commonwealths for "the foresight of their own preservation", the 
protection of their most basic natural right, that of life itself (Hobbes 1651, 17, 
109). '  The commonwealth is said to exist when a multitude of men “agree and 
covenant, everyone with every one,... to live peaceably amongst themselves, 
and be protected against [the intrusion or attack of] other men” (Hobbes 1651, 
18, 113).
Mutual agreement was also a concept of Rousseau's. As Abraham Edel 
quotes Rousseau, in his 1762 work. Social Contract, “the undertakings which 
bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and 
their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without 
working for ourselves" (Edel, Flower, and O’Connor 1989, 280). " Edel also 
quotes Thomas Paine who stated, in Rights o f Man (1789), that ‘civil rights' are 
those that are deposited within a common stock of the society of which he is an 
equal proprietor. The power of the civil right is made up of an aggregate of the 
natural rights that he has shared with the other members of the community 
(Edel, Flower, and O’Connor 1989, 280). The power of the individual, with 
respect to those shared natural rights, along with the added power of the civil 
rights, are based in what has come to be known as Law.
As a result of the formation of the commonwealth certain rules must be 
established for the conduct of its members. These are what civil laws are all 
about. Law, as outlined by Locke, “is the standard of right and wrong, and the
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common measure to decide all controversies between them” (Locke 1690,
§124). Locke professes that given the human predisposition to look out for
oneself and to violate the rights of others, it was necessary to set civil
governments to enforce the social contract of civilized society. This is a society
of free individuals assenting to a collective will and all must live within the
boundaries as set up by the civil government. This is the agreement given by
individuals for the privilege of living in the society. Laws are also part of the
social contract agreed to by people and among persons within the community in
which they reside for the extension of the common good. Hobbes broadens the
definition slightly when he says.
Civil Law is to every subject, those rules, which the commonwealth hath 
commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to 
make use of, for the distinction of right, and wrong; that is to say, of what is 
contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule (Hobbes 1651, 16).
While the overall general issue of community may be of some significance, 
the issue of what are the requirements for the individuals within that community 
must be grounded in responsibility or obligations. This organized conduct with 
a view toward the ‘common good' is what the concept of community is all about. 
Rights and obligations then are not conditions limiting the common good, but 
conditions of the varying situations of the intermingled relations of persons 
within their community (Hobhouse 1965, 43). * Rights talk is also mandatory 
performance and brings up connotations of enforcement as well as of voluntary 
compliance.
Responsibilities, on the opposing side, seem grounded in a voice of 
accountability and encouragement. These two positions each offer a different
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perspective on individual performance within a community atmosphere. One 
says, "I have rights that you must respect,” while the other speaks of “the good 
that would be achieved by your thoughtful consideration of others in the 
community”. One is a coercive or demanding tone, while the other has a 
persuasive and reciprocating tone. A side effect of the rights / responsibilities 
discussion is the way the person who is the objective focus of the discussion 
will respond. If the person is compelled to act they may become embittered, 
whereas a person that is persuaded to fulfill a responsibility, may make the 
actor view the response to the higher impulse, a more noble action (Etzioni 
1995, 41).  ^ Amitai Etzioni, in his conscription of communitarian values states 
that:
The exclusive pursuit of one's own self-interest is not even a good 
prescription for conduct in the marketplace: for no social, political, or moral 
order can survive that way. Some measure of caring, sharing, and being 
our brother's and sister's keeper is essential if we are not all to fall back on 
an ever more expansive government, bureaucratized welfare agencies, and 
swollen regulations, police, courts, and jails (Etzioni 1995, 16).
The concept of community must also be viewed as an entity in itself. If we 
are to believe in the concept of community then the rights and obligations of that 
entity must be allowed to exist. “The community itself may be said to have 
rights, that is just claims upon its members and all of its constituent elements” 
(Hobhouse 1965, 41). It has been critically stated that the Communitarian 
Philosophy insists that “rights have to be balanced by responsibility, [and] that 
they seem more interested in the responsibility of the community as a whole- ‘its 
responsibility*, say to the least fortunate members, than in the responsibility of 
individuals” (Etzioni 1995, 65). This criticism is of no value as the
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communitarian, while committed to individual self worth and respect, serves a
higher group responsibility that is created by individual actions. A more realistic
approach is that modem society, as a result of the rights onslaught, has created
a paradox. This situation calls attention to the fact that “as a community we may
care more about the suffering of a few persons whose fate we confront directly
than about the many thousands for whom we may be more distantly
responsible” (Etzioni 1998, 114). ■
The issues related to the public health are also a part of the communitarian
philosophy. Etzioni best sums it up when he states:
When it comes to public health, people who carry [blood borne transmitted] 
diseases, especially when the illness is always fatal, such as AIDS, should 
be expected to disclose their illness ... and to inform all health care 
personnel with whom they come in contact. It is their contribution to help 
stem the epidemic (Etzioni 1995, 21).
The health care worker must also be responsible to the community at large, 
not to place them at risk, to assist in the fight of a communal public health 
epidemic, and to assure the safest possible health care environment.
Since the AMA policy statement that “physicians who are HIV infected should 
refrain from performing exposure prone procedures”, physicians that are NOT 
responsive to the policy could be said to be in violation of their ‘responsibility’ 
as both physicians and members of the community. This objective 
determination o f responsibility, based on the AMA conscription of “refraining 
from performing exposure prone procedures”, is anchored in a community 
value. When the “physician community” feels that the best course of action is a
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policy of restraint of individuals, than the general community may wish to affirm
the obligation. Etzioni states:
This is not primarily a legal matter. On the contrary, when a community 
reaches the point at which responsibilities are largely enforced by the 
powers of the state, it is in deep moral crisis. If communities are to 
function well, most members most of the time must discharge their 
responsibilities because they are committed to do so, not because they 
fear lawsuits, penalties, or jails. Nevertheless, the state and its agencies 
must take care not to harm the structures of civil society on which we all 
depend. Social environments, like natural environments, cannot be taken 
for granted (Etzioni 1995, 22).
It is the community's responsibility to its members that will be the foundation for
the assertion of the previous policy chapter. “Responsive communities define
what is expected of people...and it is communities that introduce and sustain
these commitments (Etzioni 1995, 22). It will fall to the individual members of
the community to respect the individual needs for privacy, confidentiality, and
autonomy as well as to assure that the duties and obligations of the individual
member are articulated by the community. The duty of the individual physician,
HIV infected or not, is to assure that inadvertent transmission of the disease
does not occur to unknowing individuals. In this same vein, Bayer and Toomey
discuss the professional ethic:
From the perspective of the ethics of the clinical relationship, those who 
may have been placed at risk unknowingly have a moral right to such 
information. The moral claim of those who have unknowingly been 
placed at risk entails the correlative moral duty of the clinician to ensure 
that the unsuspecting party is informed (Etzioni 1995, 84).
Physicians have a duty to the community. Duty to the medical community 
consists in stemming an out-of-control public health epidemic by assistance, at 
every tum of the wheel, to curb the AIDS epidemic. Duty to the community at
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large is to not place the public at a risk of infection that could be avoided, 
despite the assessment of risk potential. In the absence of the above, the 
general public must be allowed to choose who will, or will not, place them at 
risk. It is the physician's obligation to the community. It is a fundamental right of 
the community, medical or general, to expect their members to live up to their 
obligations. The practice of medicine is not a right, but a privilege extended to 
members of the community. That privilege is extended to members that observe 
and live up to obligations that correlate to that privilege. It is the community's 
right to demand obligatory performance in certain areas. This is well grounded 
in law. The moral duty is owed by the physician to the community, for the 
privilege of practicing medicine within that community.
This section has presented a moral argument grounded in Communitarian 
Philosophy. The ‘greater community of good', however that is established, is 
the foundation for this justification. Individual and community concems must be 
balanced in order to achieve an overall social well-being. Without upholding 
the moral obligation the physician owes to the community, he places himself in 
a position where he jeopardizes, not oniy the community's, but his own welfare. 
In the next chapter, we will argue, from an Aristotelian viewpoint, how the 
physician risks his own well-being by not seeking a conciiiatory position.
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CHAPTER 7
Well-being Justification 
The conflicts that seem to arise within the medical community itself are more 
than just how to deal with the AIDS-afflicted health care worker and his or her 
ability to deliver safe and effective treatment to patients entrusted to their care.
The argument in this chapter will show that by nor choosing a position that 
assures the appropriate moral conduct for the individual surgeon, he or she 
risks their own moral destruction. The chapter will argue for conduct that 
assures that this destruction does not occur. It is the true "high moral 
ground". When actions of an individual serve both the community aspects 
of right moral conduct and also serves to assure the ultimate 'well-being' 
of the individual by this conduct, then a truly virtuous or morally whole person 
has arisen. This is the ultimate moral argument - that of an individual, acting 
in his or her own behalf, and contributing to the 'common good*.
The physician, specifically the surgeon, is mandated by the most recent 
Code of Professional Ethics, published by the AMA and the recommendations 
set down by the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, to refrain from the 
performance of 'invasive procedures’ on patients if the doctor or surgeon is 
infected with AIDS.^ The problem arises when the surgeon refuses to refrain 
from these procedures.
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Many arguments have been brought forth in favor of the surgeon’s discretion. 
These arguments, in the language o f protection from discrimination through the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the fact that the health care worker, 
in general, is more at risk of acquiring the disease from the patient than the 
patient is from acquiring it from the health care worker, only seek to divert the 
real issue of protecting the patient from further or greater harm. None of these 
arguments circumvent the ethical responsibility of the surgeon not to subject his 
patients to any more risk than is reasonable and to inform them completely of 
any and all such risks. While the risk of acquiring AIDS from an infected 
surgeon may be remote, the catastrophic consequences warrant disclosure. 
Disclosure is tantamount to suspension of surgical privileges and will, in 
essence, remove the surgeon’s ability to eam a living from surgery. The result 
is that the AIDS-afflicted surgeon has been driven 'underground' with his 
affliction by not disclosing. By doing this he or she has removed all available 
efforts and resources of support, both emotional for dealing with the affliction, 
and governmental in the protective legislation now in effect. He has effectively 
isolated himself from all elements of his society, his colleagues, his patients, 
and possibly even his family and friends. This legislation, albeit broadsweeping 
in nature, protects those Infected with a communicable disease from many 
forms of discrimination including, but not limited to, employment, and housing 
(Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the ADA). Disclosure assures that the afflicted 
physician receives all the available protection that the law will afford him.
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Achieving well-being is the end and meaning of the concept of being human; 
it is the fullest realization of the human function as outlined by Aristotle in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  ^ The function of a man is to be actively exercising the 
rational faculties of the 'soul'; the function of the good man is the activity of the 
soul in conformance with virtue or excellence of standards. Just as the harp 
player's function is to play the harp, the good harpist's function is to play well; 
therefore, the good man is distinguished from man, in general, by his 
conformity with excellence or virtue in his actions (N.E. I. vii. 14-15).
Virtue, as defined by Aristotle, is the observance of the moral mean, the state 
between two vices, that of excess and deficiency, and it is a middle point in 
feelings and actions. T h is  is why it is a hard task to be good, for it is hard to find 
the middle point in anything". For in observing the mean, the actions and 
emotions have to be focused on the right person, at the proper time and in the 
right amount, in the correct way, and for the proper purpose (N.E. II. vi. 16, II. xi. 
2). If at any time the surgeon were to focus the actions and emotions of a 
particular decision on anyone other than the patient, the physician risks 
committing an unethical act.
The effort of the good man must also occupy a lifetime and not merely be a 
passing activity. For the physician/surgeon whose life's function is dedicated to 
the health of his patients, the inability to fulfill his function in life must make him 
truly unhappy (N.E. I. vii. 16). This is not to say that all AIDS-afflicted surgeons 
are unhappy. Those that focus the activity away from direct patient care or 
invasive procedures, may be able to fulfill their human function well, for "no
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supremely happy man can ever become miserable* and the "truly good ...man 
will bear all kinds of (mis)fortune... and will always act in the noblest manner 
that the circumstances will allow" (N.E. I. x. 13). This makes poignant the 
examination of the case of the AIDS-afflicted surgeon who refuses to refrain 
from the performance of invasive procedures, and therefore participates in 
harmful or base actions. Such a person would become a supremely unhappy 
man. unable to fulfill his function as a human.
The discrepancy between why certain afflicted surgeons achieve well-being 
and others do not, lies in the approach each uses to the activity. Aristotle 
argues for three general human character dispositions, two of vice and one of 
virtue (N.E. II. viii. 1). Virtuous actions constitute achieving the 'mean', the point 
between the vices of excess and deficiency, those of neither too little nor too 
much. The two dispositions of excess and deficiency are what the good man 
seeks to avoid. By the mean, Aristotle would also say that the concept is 
relative to each individual. (This is opposed to the mathematical mean between 
any two quantities.) As in the amount of exercise needed for the body - too little 
and the body may atrophy, too much will cause injury - so too, any expert in any 
art will seek to avoid the excess and deficiency and seek and adopt the mean, 
relative to that individual in that kind of action (N.E. II. vi. 6,7,8.). For the AIDS- 
afflicted surgeon there must be a moral mean by which he is able to fulfill his 
life's work and protect the health and welfare of the patient population as well.
The vices of this individual appear clear, although each may be argued at 
either end of the spectrum, of excess or deficiency. In the deficiency, the
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physician would refrain from all practice of medicine and leam another art that 
may satisfy his needs for well-being as a human. While this appears, on the 
surface, to be an acceptable course of action to the patient population, the 
surgeon would ultimately see his life's work destroyed and be unhappy. As in 
the despair of the writer told that he can no longer write, or the artist told that he 
can no longer paint or sculpt, so the physician is subjected to his own 
destruction.
We can also argue that deficiency of action constitutes vice. For the 
physician who refuses to suspend or modify his existing practice, in deference 
to patient safety, practices a deficiency of the morally right action. There is no 
firm ethical basis by which this physician can claim to be acting in a virtuous 
manner, for if seeking the mean constitutes virtue and the mean lies between 
excess and deficiency, there can be no mean in the vices themselves (N.E. II. vi. 
20.). By refusing to act, the physician has committed a base action for no 
deficiency can have a mean.
On the other side of the mean, the surgeon who continues to practice could 
be considered to participate in excess. In this model the surgeon continues to 
operate without interference and reaps all the benefits of maintaining his 
surgical practice including the monetary rewards and prestige associated with 
being a surgeon. By assuming that he must give up ail the associated benefits 
that go with being a surgeon, he refuses for selfish reasons to disclose his 
affliction, and participates in reaping an excess of that to which he is entitled.
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We can also argue moral excess from the other end of the spectrum. The 
surgeon who completely suspends the practice of medicine (because he feels 
that he can no longer provide for his patients in a safe manner) also can be said 
to participate in a form of the vice of excess. From an epidemiological 
standpoint, this is a true excess of action. For the reality of the nature of the 
disease and the transmission of same would not involve severing complete 
contact with patients, only contact that could be deemed invasive or any other 
manner that may compromise the patient's safety. Using an Aristotelian 
example of Cowardice and Rashness, the physician who totally refuses to 
disclose his affliction in his own self interest could be considered a coward and 
he who totally suspends the medical practice, rash. The mean for the afflicted 
physician would be the Courage to find some form of medicine that does not 
involve ‘invasive’ patient care. For the surgeon it may be research or teaching, 
as there are many avenues of medical practice that do not involve ‘invasive’ 
patient care. In fact the vast majority of the practice of medicine does not 
involve invasive procedures’. It further fits Aristotle's definition in the fact that 
the cowardice of inaction is greatly more opposed than the rashness of 
complete suspension. Complete suspension would be a safer course than that 
of inaction, and therefore the rashness is closer to the mean of courage and the 
cowardice of inaction more opposed (N.E. II. viii. 5-8).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
Justice
The discussion must also contain the aspects of justice, that of a universal 
concept of the whole of virtue, and the universal concept of the whole of vice. 
The sense of fairness, or justice, has a history that dates to pre-Socratic Greece. 
"Justice (Sike) consisted in everything [having its own assigned place and] 
staying in it's assigned place, and not usurping the place of another” (Feinberg 
and Gross 1986, 333). '  We will dismiss the aspects of justice in a distributive 
(monetary or lawful) sense as irrelevant to the discussion at hand, since they 
offer no impact on the central issues being examined. Although the monetary 
aspects of the highly paid surgeon might be discussed, they are best saved for 
another forum.
The practice of virtue toward someone else is the concept of universal 
justice, and the contrary of the practice of vice toward another is universal 
injustice. Aristotle defines particular justice in two forms, that of distributive 
justice and corrective justice. It is the latter that will be examined first in this 
discussion, although a distributive argument will be offered later in the chapter. 
Corrective justice will only consider "the nature of the damage done, treating the 
parties as equal, and merely asking whether one has done and the other 
suffered injustice, whether one has inflicted and the other has sustained 
damage" (N.E. V. iv. 3).
This model is applicable to the physician /  patient example we have been 
using, although the application will be strained. For the physician who infects a 
patient, although the resultant infection was not of a deliberate nature (this is an
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assumption that must be made because the ethical platform would never 
support the concept of murder), the patient is harmed as a result of the doctor's 
actions. This is an injustice on the part of the physician, one that is presumably 
uncorrectable from an equity standpoint, and so must fall into the universal 
category of injustice, that of vice toward another. For the concept of this form of 
particular justice to apply, the assumption that both parties be considered 
equals must be upheld. But this equity cannot be assumed from a pure moral 
standpoint. This equity assumption could be a reasonable attack within a civil 
court of law, but even then, the universal injustice of vice toward another will 
apply because of the special (some would say even intimate) relationship 
between doctor and patient. The physician is placed in a position of trust, that 
he or she will stand by their oath and seek to preserve the health and welfare of 
their patients. When the physician places the patient at risk, a risk that could 
have been avoided or completely eliminated, he violates his basic oath as a 
physician and commits the most heinous of injustices. "Justice is that quality in 
virtue of which a man is said to be disposed to do by deliberate choice that 
which is just” (N.E. V. v. 17).
In order adequately to examine the concept of choice, the actions must first 
be determined to be under the control of the individual committing the acts. If 
the physician were to argue that the actions, that of participating in the invasive 
care of the patients, were compulsory and involuntary in nature, he would have 
to argue that the action or the reason for the action lies outside of the agent 
committing the act. To argue that societal blackballing and the monetary
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hardship imposed on the AIDS-afflicted physician makes his actions based on 
compulsion is not a view that holds up under scrutiny. For no matter how much 
this hardship could be, it does not meet the criteria for acts under compulsion. It 
is not outside of the control of the agent, he does not have a fear of a worse 
alternative, other than his own displeasure, and the given circumstances do not 
warrant the deliberate choice of the base action; for the base action, that of 
placing the patient at risk, is worse than the hardship argued for the compulsion. 
For the actions to be considered of a mixed nature (also intrinsically involuntary 
in scope), the actions must pose too great a hardship or strain for the agent to 
endure (N.E. III. i. 7). The hardship (monetary o r otherwise) imposed on the 
physician, that of the suspension of surgical practice, has been clearly shown to 
be not one of the virtuous choices but one of the vices. The choice of the 
physician to claim to have to substitute one vice for another in the defense of his 
actions is clearly choosing the worse of the two by continuing to practice. As 
has been shown, cowardice is further from courage than rashness.
Yet these actions do seem to fall under the class of 'mixed' actions, for "there 
seem to be some acts which a man cannot be compelled to do, and rather than 
do them he ought to submit to the most terrible death" (N.E. ill. i. 8). The 
physician who claims that his actions are involuntary and blames external 
influences and claims no origination for the action argues from the absurd. He 
refuses to take responsibility for falling easy prey to his own passions and 
desires, and tries to blame the disgraceful actions on the temptations from 
external forces. The actions of this nature are clearly voluntary in nature for the
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nature of the action originates within the agent. It is the choice of the physician, 
knowing the particular circumstances in which he is acting, that will constitute 
the virtue or the vice ( N.E. III. i. 11,20).
Choice is defined as "voluntary action preceded by deliberation" (N.E. III. ii. 
17). The deliberative aspects are related to things which are within our control. 
We do not deliberate about insensible things as the fool or the madman, about 
regular or irregular occurrences, or about chance items or those that are 
eternal. "We deliberate (only) about that which is in our control and is attainable 
by action” (N.E. III. iii. 7). Since the action is an essential part of the deliberative 
process (for no one would deliberate about things that are unattainable for that 
would be mere wishing), it must follow that it is the means upon which 
deliberation is focused, as opposed to the end. The end is just that, the end, 
and no action is attributed to the end. "A doctor does not deliberate whether he 
is to cure his patient” , he deliberates about the actions that will achieve the goal 
of curing him and these actions must be attainable or reasonable (N.E. III.
1.11,15). This deliberation must not be without correctness, for deliberation that 
arrives at wrong or improper conclusions or aims at misdirected goals is said to 
be deficient of excellence.
Deliberative excellence involves a process of investigation and calculation 
and, by the action of choice, arriving at something good. For deliberative 
excellence to be achieved, what qualities must be attributed to the process? 
First, the deliberation must span a certain amount of time, for no true decisions 
are made on the spur of the moment (except by trained habit). We must reach
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the right conclusion for, obviously, if we reach the wrong conclusion there has 
been a fault within the deliberative process; and it follows that we must reach it 
on the right grounds and at the right time. Improper grounds, or the wrong 
reasons, render the reasoning flawed as decisions delayed are often decisions 
and opportunities lost. For a man to judge whether his deliberation is good 
(deliberative excellence) he employs understanding or the capacity to judge 
rightly. He must also be considerate or forgiving of others and be able to judge 
rightly what are the equitable solutions essential to achieving the action 
necessary to reach the proper conclusion. This is the prudent man. One who 
through the correctness of deliberation and consideration of others, arrives at 
an equitable solution on the right grounds, at the right time, and in the right 
manner is said to be prudent. Prudence is the action employing all of these 
features and the correct action is said to be the virtuous one if employed with 
prudence. One does not achieve prudence easily for many factors contribute to 
the acquisition of this nature.
It should suffice to say that experience, consideration, deliberative 
excellence, and equitable judgment are the marks of the prudent man. So in 
the case of the physician who reaches for the solution to the dilemma of 
continuing his medical practice and placing his patients at risk, or to seek some 
reasonable alternative and still achieve the human function, the complete 
process must conform to a set of actions determined by a principle as defined 
by the prudent man. This is how the process of choice is determined, and 
correct choice leads to the correct actions. These actions, correctly deliberated.
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considered, and judged to be equitable, will produce a virtuous end (N.E. VI.). 
The rights of special individuals, those of disability rights, and aspects of 
autonomy must be taken into account. The quandary produced when the moral 
theories and these ‘rights’ come into conflict is readily apparent in contemporary 
society. The concept of equity as a form of fairness, and perceived injustices 
based on the violation of the aforementioned rights is the basis for much of the 
discussion.
Now we must look at the aspects of distributive justice as they apply to the 
practical workings of moral theory. The issue central to the disabled community 
with regards to legislation is the ‘equal’ opportunity to participate in the vast 
amount that society has to offer all other individuals not so afflicted and to be 
afforded the necessary accommodations to facilitate this participation. This 
equity, as the disabled community would view it, is something that is long in 
coming. This equity is the mean against a slew of continual injustices that has 
always plagued the disabled community.
The Aristotelian view is that "Justice is a mode of observing the mean...", and 
for the disabied individuals they live a form of injustice because "Injustice is 
related to the extremes” (NE, V. v. 17). That is, disabled living is an extreme 
when ‘normal’ functioning is prohibited due to curbs at the sidewalk and stairs 
in a building. This may be best viewed as a function of and within the realm of 
Political Justice. The application of political justice for the disabled individual is 
the scrutiny of the basic inequities of opportunity that exist by convention. The 
"administration of law” and the deciding of "what is just and what is unjust" is the
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application of political justice (NE, V. vi, 4). Paul Schollmeier states it best when
he relates the concept of well-being associated with political justice.
Both lawful men and fair men wish for and act for the well-being of others. 
And to wish and to act for the [well-being] of others is the first mark of 
friendship. What is lawful aims at the actions required for the [well-being] 
of others, and what is fair aims at the distribution of goods necessary for 
the [well-being] of others or at the rectification of the distribution of these 
goods (Schollmeier 1984,104). "
Prof. Schollmeier continues with the assertion that both justice and political 
friendship have the same motives and objects of focus. "Just people are thus 
other selves to one another, numerically different and morally the same” and 
"people find the [well-being] of one another to be an object of pleasant 
apperception” (Schollmeier 1994, 104). This reciprocal good feeling toward 
one another and recognition of individual worth (autonomy) coupled with a 
mean that is similar in substance (between justice and friendship) is the basis 
for political justice and friendship (Schollmeier 1994, 105).
This chapter’s discussion has revolved around correct actions of the prudent 
man and that of the complete performance, man’s proper function, a kind of 
activity inherently fulfilling, "evSainovia” or well-being. Using the process of 
choice, the informed physician (and about disease, whether infected or not, the 
physician must be considered informed) by choosing the path of either non­
disclosure or the complete suspension of practice chooses vice and therefore 
will not accomplish the human function at its best, that is, his own well-being. 
Choosing to suspend practice would only impact the physician and while it will 
not lead to well-being, it is probably the lesser of two evils. Yet the physician 
who continues to practice without the knowledge or consent of his patients
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commits an injustice of the greatest sort, an injustice against his fellow man, a 
universal injustice. When a man, property informed, through the process of 
deliberation, chooses an action that could only be considered base, he 
contributes to his own moral self-destruction. When he is fully aware of the 
situation, of the risks, consequences, and resultant potential outcomes, yet he 
still chooses vice, then he can never be truly happy. One can go even further 
and say that being in a position of trust, the physician has the moral obligation, 
based on his oath as a physician, and the true intimacy of the physician /  patient 
relationship not to practice actions considered dangerous or to place the patient 
at risk to situations that can be avoided. This is far superior to the common risks 
associated with surgical procedures, as those are informed risks and the patient 
is fully aware of these and they are outlined and discussed prior to the 
performance of any invasion. Here the physician stands on the soapbox of 
epidemiology and makes the argument that he is only obligated to inform the 
patient of any 'significant risks', and that the risk of his transmitting the disease 
is too remote to be considered significant. He fails in this analysis because he 
does not let the patient achieve the same level of choice, through the 
deliberative process, that he has been allowed to pursue. He has, in essence, 
chosen to focus the action and emotional reasoning on the "\vrong” person. He 
does not allow the patient's needs to take precedence over his own and 
therefore cannot be morally justified. If he informed the patient of the remote 
chance of cross infection and the patient chose to keep the surgeon, both 
choices would be morally justifiable.
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One additional argument in our discussion of the ethically whole person is 
that the physician who has AIDS might be obligated to refrain from the practice 
of medicine entirely because of the possibility that the practitioner may infect the 
patient, and such an act would be in itself base. For a surgeon willfully to 
subject a patient to the potential risk of death without the expressed written 
consent of the patient would constitute either malice or even murder if the 
patient were to become infected. These are actions that have no possible moral 
mean to observe, and are by their very nature, evil actions. Blatantly evil 
actions cannot be tolerated, much less recommended. They would be a true, 
universal injustice, not only from the level of activity, but from the level of one's 
entire being. Such a physician would be an evil individual. ^
Finger pointing at this stage in the argument would be ill-timed, and I do not 
wish to make a case for murderous actions. This is brought out only as an aside 
that is most ugly at best. Some individuals have been charged with attempted 
murder of police officers for biting and scratching these officers when they are 
known HIV positive cases. A similar action could be brought against individuals 
who place someone at risk of great bodily injury without their 'informed' 
consent It is a trap that the medical community should wish to avoid at all costs.
A strong advocacy of complete suspension from practice would also be 
inappropriate now, given all that has been said in the previous pages, but we 
must make one distinction clear - there can be no morally justifiable decision 
regarding HIV infection that leads to willfully risking patient safety without 
informed consent. Moral integrity is concomitant with moral well-being. Afflicted
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and non-affiicted physicians alike would have to deliberate on the risk of 
infecting a patient with HIV. This deliberative excellence is essential for the 
morally whole individual to effectively choose right" action. They owe it to 
themselves, their profession, and the community at large to give this important 
topic its just and rightful merit. Individual surgeon’s choices are personal on first 
reflection, but are also constitutive, each in its way, of the moral quality of the 
community as well. Thus community well-being and a morally cooperative and 
supportive community needs just moral choices from its members, including 
physicians. This cooperative effort, that is strictly dependent on the just moral 
actions of the individual, is the key to the well-being of the community at large.
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Chapter Notes
1. The term physician" and ‘surgeon" shall be used interchangeably as all 
surgeons must be physicians and all physicians are trained as surgeons. 
Specialty surgeons may have greater training in specialized areas, but this 
does not impact the discussion or this qualifier. The term ‘AIDS" shall be used 
generically to refer to all individuals who have AIDS, are HIV positive, or are 
afflicted with any disturbance to the immune system associated with the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).
2. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1926). All notations within the text will be from this 
edition and will be referenced by (N.E., followed by the text citation).
3. Joel Feinberg, Hyman Gross, Philosophy o f Law, Third Edition; 
(Wadsworth Publishing, 1986), 333.
4. Paul Schollmeier, Other Selves, Aristotle on Personal and Political 
Friendship, (Albany. State University of New York Press, 1994).
5. See: Dennis L. Breo, "The dental AIDS cases-Murder or an unsolvable 
mystery?”, J. Am. Med. A. (JAMA), (December 8, 1993), v. 270, no. 22; reference 
also: Kimberly Bergaiis /  David Acer, D.D.S.
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion
This thesis has centered around the surgeon who is HIV positive. We have 
attempted to show the need for a real change in current policy because of four 
main arguments. When a public health epidemic causes concern over the risks 
of disease transmission, then corrective action that is reasonable, sensible, and 
plausible must be offered. This work has attempted to do just that. There are 
many objections to what has been offered in this thesis and I have attempted to 
address those objections in a straight-forward manner, but in no way did I try to 
appease all of the players involved. I have merely tried to be as fair-minded as 
possible given the real problem within the healthcare arena. Fear of disease 
transmission on both sides of the spectrum, whether it is from the occupational 
side of the provider or from the patient side, has brought a degree of paralysis to 
the healthcare system.
Rights and Responsibilities 
Rights and responsibilities must always go hand-in-hand. One without the 
other leaves its counter hanging by a thread of accountability. As we have 
shown, people have a natural right to life and this right can never be
120
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taken away from them. The issue of a patient’s right to this life is the firm ground 
on which healthcare is based using the autonomy model. Those seeking to 
violate these rights negate their responsibility to the patient. Patients cannot be 
relieved of this autonomous consideration. The medical community cannot 
decide for the patients what is best for them. This paternalistic treatment is 
contrary to autonomous consideration of the patient and makes the patient only 
an object of the physician's orders. This is unacceptable.
If HIV positive healthcare providers seek to practice in an ‘exposure prone' 
environment, then they have a moral responsibility not to cross-infect their 
patients. The responsibility is dual. They have a duty to the patient for his or 
her life and a duty to the community in fighting the epidemic. The community’s 
rights cannot go understated and are part of the strong moral tone of this work. 
We, as members of society, have a strong moral obligation to require that those 
who have the privilege of practicing medicine in our society, do not risk our lives 
when given this privilege, regardless of their intent. Rights, or privileges, 
without correlative responsibilities, or duties, cannot be justified.
Disability Law and Legislation 
We have attempted to give ia\r treatment to current disability laws. We also 
believe that the current laws are more than complete in the protections of the 
HIV positive community their rights against discrimination must be guarded 
zealously. Court decisions in Aiiine  and Chalk have succeeded in this 
protection. This also has shown that these HIV positive individuals, while
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included in §504 and the ADA, cannot show that they are ‘otherwise qualified' 
and absent of direct threat* in specific areas, particularly in the surgical theater. 
The use of common law in Behringer and Doe show that the courts are 
unwilling to allow the potential risk of transmission to be subjected to unwilling 
patients. Canons of ‘informed consent" have been applied to surgeons seeking 
to continue to practice and it has been argued that this doctrine is discriminatory 
against handicapped individuals. The counter argument considered in Chapter 
Three has been based on the assessment of risk and what constitutes real risk 
from an epidemiological basis. The failure of this argument is in the statistical 
analysis where the effort to totally eliminate the risk of mortality due to diseaise 
transmission cannot be accomplished. Remote or not, transmission is possible 
and given the pandemic nature of the problem and the real percutaneous injury 
risk to surgical practitioners, they cannot be considered to be absent of direct 
threat'. This is also applicable to the student surgeon and raises even a 
stronger risk from the inexperienced or surgical trainee.
When drafting these laws, legislators raised concerns about inclusion of 
individuals based on membership in high risk groups. While these arguments 
may feed the hysteria surrounding this disease, they are truly misplaced. In 
general, the wording of the laws may allow inclusion of these individuals if they 
are “perceived as having the disease”, but this inclusion has no real impact on 
the overall effect of the legislation. The current laws have enough flexibility to 
assure fair and unbiased treatment for a ll infected individuals, physicians and
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surgeons included, will be afforded given the current trend of cases testing 
these pieces of legislation.
The rights of disabled individuals must be observed so as not to drive the 
afflicted underground and Into hiding because of their infected status. This 
does not relieve the community from protecting its constituents. The continued, 
above-board approach to the tracking of the virus must be lasting and the public 
health agencies must be afforded the tools and the resources to facilitate this 
effort
Policy
All of this said in no way offers a different course of action than the proposed
change in policy presented in Chapter Five. The proposed policy has four
different components;
I) Professional associations, specifically the American Medical Association 
and the American Dental Association, must collaborate with their scientific 
colleagues to specifically determine which procedures in healthcare 
delivery are determined to be ‘exposure prone'.
The professional associations, as well as the Centers for Disease Control, have
not defined which procedures are to be considered ‘exposure prone'. This
lapse in official policy must be corrected. If the associations are to continue to
argue that they are the best guardians of their own affairs then they, and only
they, can determine what is considered ‘exposure prone' and what is not. I also
argue that, in the absence of action by the professional association, the CDC
should take the lead and make this determination. The reluctance by the CDC
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is based on the close and necessary participation by the associations in the 
overall goals of the Centers. This does not relieve their moral obligation.
II) Professional associations must place into their individual policy, 
procedure, and ethical platforms specific guidelines for HIV positive 
physicians and surgeons as to when they can and when they cannot 
perform procedures on patients.
The ambiguous language in the AMA’s policy compendium regarding actions
that the afflicted surgeon should do and what a local review committee may do
serves no useful purpose except to offer alternatives that step away from sound
moral judgment. When the AMA policy dictates that “when the scientific data
are unclear [regarding the real risk of transmission], it is mandatory that the
rights of the patient take precedence over those of the physician”, it is difficult to
understand why a stronger stand has not been taken regarding what the HIV
positive surgeon w ill do regarding continuation of a surgical practice involved in
‘exposure prone" procedures.
III) Surgical licensure to perform 'exposure prone’ procedures shall be tied 
to HIV testing. Any qualified provider may apply for licensure, but those 
testing positive to HIV (and possibly HbV) will be required to obtain 
‘informed consent" from the patients undergoing the aforementioned 
‘exposure prone" procedures.
The proposed policy’s mandate of surgical licensure tied to testing does not 
argue mandatory testing for all surgical providers, only those who wish to 
participate in exposure prone procedures. This is a critical distinction that 
underscores the need for the existing ambiguity to be elim inated regarding that 
performance. The tracking and clearing should be done using a national data 
base (so as to eliminate the need for state to state reciprocity and tracking) as a 
cost effective measure. It is possible that the professional associations may be
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charged with this duty, but the effort could be better handled by the Centers for
Disease Control. Not only would this help in the tracking of the HIV epidemic, it
would also track, as part of the disease control, another occupation that may be
shown to be “at risk” for the acquisition of the virus.
IV) Create a “bank" of HIV positive physicians and surgeons. Each “bank” 
will be regionally located to be called to perform ‘exposure prone" 
procedures on known HIV positive cases, if time will permit.
When proposing the concept of a bank" of HIV positive surgeons, the model 
has two sides and offers possibilities to those HIV positive surgeons still wishing 
to contribute. The first is for the surgeons still to be able to practice their craft 
and help their patients, and second, for the HIV positive surgeons to assist their 
colleagues in preventing further occupational contamination. This conceptual 
model can be well funded by governmental dollars and is a reasonable 
alternative when time allows. They must also be extremely well paid, 
eliminating the need to go underground for monetary reasons.
Moral Justification
The moral justification for this argument has taken on two different concepts, 
both logically sound. Community concerns and rights are central to the issues. 
We as a community have the right to demand that physicians live up to their 
moral obligations. It is our duty, then, to see that this happens, regardless of 
their reluctance to do so. The community has the right to be protected from 
potentially dangerous individuals seeking to place their rights above their 
responsibilities. We are not unsympathetic to their predicament, only to their
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attempt to become a “moral exception”. Their unique status will not relieve them 
of their moral obligation to the community good. Their 'professional' status only 
reinforces this concept. The proposed policy also protects the HIV positive 
individual surgeon and places his welfare at the forefront with the creation of the 
HIV positive bank" of providers. He or she is given an avenue by which 
effectively to contribute as active members of the community. This is a desirable 
component of community membership, to contribute to the good of the polis.
The Aristotelian moral justification in Chapter Seven shows how the surgeon, 
by not refraining from risk orientated behavior, contributes to his or her own 
moral destruction. The physician's moral choices, relative to his or her 
alteration of their medical practice in deference to patient safety is critical to their 
own moral well-being. Individual healthy moral foundation is an essential 
component and cannot be allowed to deteriorate, especially when more is at 
stake than the individuals themselves. The community, also, should not 
condone this - moral destruction o f the individual will ultimately lead to the 
destruction of the moral fabric of the whole community. The community’s fight is 
ongoing in this area as we fight crime and substance abuse, and seek to 
promote education and social responsibility. This is the larger moral argument, 
both from a personal standpoint and a community of good. Community rights 
aside, this moral obligation of the community must prevail in the defense of its 
members. It is the only possible outcome that serves the moral good of the 
membership.
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Epilogue
I have attempted to offend no one. But this policy stand obviously will. My 
intent is to seek a workable alternative to existing policy, which is woefully 
inadequate. I take the moral high ground because the quagmire of the statistics 
and laws has obscured the vision of ‘right action' in the given scenario. The 
stand I take is based on what actions physicians should do based on a moral 
obligation to themselves and to the community as a whole. When they attempt 
to avoid or side-step this moral obligation, we as a community must see that 
they face these responsibilities. This thesis has undertaken to argue for that 
policy and moral judgment.
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